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“In a sense any conduct in this interdependent world of ours has an 
ultimate commercial origin or consequence, but we have not yet said the 
commerce power may reach so far.”1  
—Justice Anthony Kennedy 
 
“Until this Court replaces its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
with a standard more consistent with the original understanding, we will 
continue to see Congress appropriating state police powers under the guise 
of regulating commerce.”2  
—Justice Clarence Thomas 
INTRODUCTION 
A man videotapes his sexually explicit activity with his thirteen-year-old 
god-daughter.3  Two football players rape a college freshman.4  A high 
school senior brings a gun to school.5  Two chronically ill Californians 
cultivate and use marijuana to help alleviate their pain.6  All of these 
activities are local in nature.  Thus, it is not surprising that the actors in the 
first three examples face state penalties and potential jail time in state 
prison.7  The States impose these penalties because they reflect society’s 
judgment that such conduct should be punished and, if possible, deterred.8 
                                                 
 1. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 2. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 3. United States v. Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 
S. Ct. 2929 (2005). 
 4. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602. 
 5. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
 6. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2199-2220 (2005). 
 7. But cf. id. (explaining that California’s Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 11362.5 (West 2005), exempts the actors in the fourth 
example from state criminal liability). 
 8. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5 (4th ed. 2003) (illustrating how 
criminal law aims “to prevent [people] from doing what society considers to be undesirable” 
in order to achieve a minimum standard of acceptable behavior).  But cf. The North 
American Man/Boy Love Association, NAMbLA:  Who We Are, 
http://216.220.97.17/welcome.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2005) (arguing that sexual 
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A more difficult question is whether society’s value judgments permit 
federal regulation of local behavior under the auspices of the Commerce 
Clause.9  While the Supreme Court has struck down the federal statutes 
prohibiting gun possession in school and providing a civil remedy for 
victims of gender-motivated violence,10 courts have universally upheld the 
constitutionality of statutes prohibiting the production of child 
pornography11 and the cultivation and use of illicit drugs.12  Courts 
disagree, however, over whether these statutes are unconstitutional as 
applied to particular litigants.13  This Comment explores where the lower 
courts believe these constitutional parameters should be set,14 where the 
Supreme Court defines them to be,15 and where they should be.16 
                                                 
relationships between adults and children, though criminalized by state and federal law, are 
not only acceptable, but aid children’s development). 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”). 
 10. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (finding that a provision of 
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 102-322, 108 Stat. 1941 (1994), 
which provided a federal civil remedy to victims of gender-motivated violence, exceeded 
the scope of Congress’s regulatory power under the Commerce Clause); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
567-68 (holding that a statute that proscribes gun possession in a school zone is an 
unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power). 
 11. No litigant has succeeded in bringing a facial challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) 
(2000), which criminalizes the sexual exploitation of minors through the creation of child 
pornography if either the materials used to create the pornography or the final product itself 
entered the flow of interstate commerce.  See, e.g., United States v. Morales-De Jesús, 372 
F.3d 6, 8, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding child pornography produced for personal use to 
substantially affect interstate commerce and rejecting facial challenge to § 2251(a)). 
 12. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2198 (2005). 
 13. Compare United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303, 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(upholding the defendant’s as-applied challenge to the same statute on the basis that the 
homegrown pornography was for the defendant’s own consumption), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 
2938 (2005) (remanding for reconsideration in light of Raich), with Morales-De Jesús, 372 
F.3d at 17 (denying defendant’s challenge that the federal statute proscribing the production 
of child pornography was unconstitutional as applied to his conduct since the homegrown 
pornography was for his own consumption).  While the Supreme Court recently remanded 
Smith to the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration in light of Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2199-
2220 (2005), it is worth discussing because the court’s approach has been used in other 
cases and jurisdictions.  See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042, 1067-68 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (employing the microcosmic approach and thus upholding the defendant’s as-
applied challenge to the analogous federal statute prohibiting the possession of child 
pornography), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 85 (2005) (denying Maxwell’s petition), and vacated, 
126 S. Ct. 321 (2005) (granting the government’s petition and remanding for 
reconsideration in light of Raich); United States v. Matthews, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1228, 
1237-38 (N.D. Ala. 2004) (upholding as-applied challenge to § 2251(a) where defendant 
lacked the “intention to sell, distribute, or exchange” pornographic depictions of children 
and thus failed to participate in commercial activity); United States v. Jeronimo-Bautista, 
319 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1279, 1282 (D. Utah 2004) (refusing to classify the defendant’s 
activity as economic because he did not intend to sell, distribute, or exchange the material 
and consequently upholding the defendant’s as-applied challenge to § 2251(a)), rev’d, 425 
F.3d 1266, 1273-74 (10th Cir. Oct. 12, 2005) (remanding for reconsideration in light of 
Raich). 
 14. See Smith, 402 F.3d at 1316-18 (finding § 2251(a) unconstitutional as applied to 
defendant, who produced the pornography for his own consumption, by focusing on the 
defendant’s noncommercial, local criminal behavior rather than what the statute regulates 
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Part I describes the recent trend in Commerce Clause jurisprudence—in 
which the Court has resurrected a reasonable limit to Congress’s regulatory 
power under the clause—in the decisions United States v. Lopez17 and 
United States v. Morrison.18  Part I further discusses how these decisions 
are partly responsible for the lower courts’ confusion in deciding as-applied 
challenges to the Commerce Clause.  In holding that the statutes in question 
fell outside the scope of Congress’s commerce power completely,19 the 
Court failed to provide adequate guidance for how to resolve as-applied 
challenges, in which the litigant challenges the constitutionality of a statute 
only as applied to her and those similarly situated.20 
As a result, lower courts have struggled to resolve the inherent tension 
that as-applied challenges present.21  Courts cannot realistically reduce the 
analysis to only the particular litigants, as “individual litigants could always 
exempt themselves from Commerce Clause regulation merely by pointing 
to the obvious—that their personal activities do not have a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.”22  And yet, a court essentially precludes as-
applied challenges if that court does not consider the litigants’ individual 
                                                 
generally); Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 12-15 (emphasizing what the statute regulates 
generally rather than the defendant’s particular activity to find § 2251(a) constitutional as 
applied to defendant who produced a depiction of child pornography for his own 
consumption). 
 15. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s use of the 
macrocosmic approach in resolving an as-applied challenge to the federal Controlled 
Substances Act). 
 16. See discussion infra Part V (proposing limitation of federal regulation of 
noncommercial, intrastate criminal activity with only an attenuated connection to interstate 
commerce). 
 17. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 18. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  At various points in this article, the author refers to both 
Lopez and Morrison as employing a “heightened” level of judicial scrutiny.  Although 
neither Lopez nor Morrison explicitly states that they are employing a “heightened” level of 
scrutiny, most scholars have interpreted the case as implicitly requiring a stronger 
correlation between the statute and regulated activity than previous cases.  See Christy H. 
Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name:  The Impact of United States v. Lopez 
and United States v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REV. 605, 616-17 (2001) (“The only obvious 
message sent out by Lopez and Morrison is that future Commerce Clause cases will be 
decided under a stricter standard than rational basis, although the Court did not admit that 
this is what it was doing.”). 
 19. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601-02 (striking down a provision of a federal statute that 
created a civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 
(striking down a federal statute that prohibited the possession of a firearm within a school 
zone). 
 20. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 873, 873 (2005) (explaining that facial challenges, unlike as-applied challenges, 
attack “some general rule embodied in the statute”). 
 21. See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2223 (2005) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“The task is to identify a mode of analysis that allows Congress to regulate 
more than nothing (by declining to reduce each case to its litigants) and less than everything 
(by declining to let Congress set the terms of analysis).”). 
 22. Id. 
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conduct at all.23  This inherent tension reflects two competing principles 
within the larger framework of the Court’s Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.  On the one hand, the desire to preserve the distinction 
between “what is national and what is local”24 reflects the principle that 
there must be a meaningful limit on Congress’s Commerce Clause power.25  
On the other hand is the equally significant principle that courts should 
employ a “practical conception” of the commerce power26 to avoid 
“artificially . . . constrain[ing]”27 Congress’s ability to regulate interstate 
commerce effectively.28 
                                                 
 23. Contra United States v. Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d 6, 18 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(explaining that the Court’s preclusion of “as-applied Commerce Clause challenges” that 
rest on the non-economic nature of an individual’s specific conduct that happens to fall 
within a properly regulated class of economic activity does not also preclude “as-applied 
Commerce Clause challenges” based on non-economic issues such as “constitutional 
privacy concerns” or that particular facts remove the conduct from the scope of the 
regulation), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2929 (2005). 
 24. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (warning that the 
commerce power “may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce 
so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would 
effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a 
completely centralized government” (citing Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 
U.S. 495, 547 (1935))). 
 25. See discussion infra Part I (explaining that the Court in Lopez and Morrison sought 
to resurrect the Commerce Clause principle that there must be a reasonable limit on 
Congress’s commerce power). 
 26. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 572 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 27. Id. at 556.  Prior to 1937, the Court refused to permit federal regulation of mining, 
production, manufacturing, and union membership because those activities did not fit within 
the strictest definition of commerce.  See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 269-70 
(1918) (striking down a prohibition on the interstate transportation of goods manufactured in 
violation of child labor laws because the power to regulate commerce “is directly the 
contrary of the assumed right to forbid commerce from moving”), overruled in part by 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 
3, 16 (1895) (holding the Sherman Act inapplicable to a sugar monopoly’s buyout of 
additional refineries and reasoning that the effect on interstate commerce of any centralized 
“control [of an intrastate] enterprise in manufacture, agriculture, mining, production in all its 
forms, or to raise or lower prices or wages” is merely “indirect,” even though the buyout 
completed a monopoly of ninety-eight percent of the U.S. sugar industry).  In assessing the 
constitutionality of New Deal legislation, the Court continued to use the formalistic and 
impractical distinction between indirect and direct effects on interstate commerce.  See, e.g., 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309 (1936) (striking down an act that regulated the 
wages and hours of miners because the Court held that the employer/employee relationship 
had only a “secondary and indirect” effect on interstate commerce); Schechter Poultry Corp. 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548 (1935) (declining to uphold the wage and hours 
provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act as the employees’ wages and hours had 
“no direct relation” to interstate commerce). 
 28. E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121-25 (1942) (repudiating the impractical 
classifications of the pre-1937 cases as an artificial restraint on Congress’s power to regulate 
interstate commerce, and instead opting for a practical understanding of the commerce 
power); see also id. at 123 n.24 (“Whatever terminology is used, the criterion is necessarily 
one of degree and must be so defined.  This does not satisfy those who seek for 
mathematical or rigid formulas.  But such formulas are not provided by the great concepts of 
the Constitution . . . .” (quoting Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453, 467 
(1938))). 
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Part II examines two diametrically opposed approaches to resolving this 
tension in the particular context of as-applied challenges to the Child 
Pornography Prevention Act (“CPPA”),29 which criminalizes the 
production of child pornography developed with materials that have 
traveled in interstate commerce.30  Each approach focuses exclusively on 
one of the competing principles within the Court’s Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence to support its analysis.  Focusing exclusively on the need for 
a practical conception of the commerce power, the macrocosmic approach 
places more significance on what the statute regulates generally than on the 
litigants’ particular conduct.31  Concerned with the need for a meaningful 
limit on Congress’s commerce power, the microcosmic approach 
emphasizes the litigants’ particular activity.32 
The Supreme Court has recently rendered a decision on the 
constitutional parameters of as-applied challenges to the Commerce Clause.  
Part III demonstrates how the Court opted for the macrocosmic approach in 
Gonzales v. Raich.33  As Raich indicates, and as part III discusses, the 
macrocosmic approach will likely prevail over the microcosmic approach 
when deciding as-applied challenges to the intrastate production of child 
pornography.34 
While the Raich decision provides much needed clarification for 
resolving as-applied challenges, the Court’s approach is flawed.  Part IV 
demonstrates how the Court, in focusing exclusively on the need for a 
                                                 
 29. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (2003). 
 30. This Comment does not explore the First Amendment implications of child 
pornography law.  Rather, it is focuses on the constitutional analysis of as-applied 
challenges to the intrastate, homegrown production of child pornography for the producer’s 
personal consumption.  For cases tackling the interplay of child pornography law and the 
First Amendment, see Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002) (finding 
that the ban on virtual child pornography in the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 
was overbroad and thus unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it restricted a 
substantial amount of lawful speech); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) 
(concluding that the States may criminalize at-home possession of child pornography 
because a State’s compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-
being of minors trumps the individual’s right to receive information in the privacy of his or 
her home); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758, 773 (1982) (upholding a New York law 
that prohibited the distribution of non-obscene child pornography because the state had a 
compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors). 
 31. See discussion infra Part II.A (reviewing argument that Congress’s ability to 
regulate such a defendant’s noncommercial activity is nevertheless constitutional because 
the defendant’s activity falls within the broader regulatory purpose of a statute regulating 
commercial activity). 
 32. See infra note 114 and accompanying text (noting that a defendant’s intrastate, 
noncommercial conduct should be beyond Congress’s regulatory reach because the 
Constitution did not grant Congress a national police power). 
 33. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
 34. See discussion infra Part III.C (demonstrating that a defendant will not prevail with 
an as-applied challenge to § 2251(a) on the basis that defendant produced the pornography 
for personal consumption). 
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practical conception of the Commerce Clause,35 construed the 
constitutional parameters too broadly, so that little activity is actually 
beyond the scope of federal regulation.36  Part V sets forth an alternate 
approach for resolving as-applied challenges that strikes a balance between 
the need for a practical conception of the commerce power and the need to 
provide a reasonable limit to what Congress may regulate, as the Court did 
in Lopez and Morrison.37 
I. IN PURSUIT OF A MEANINGFUL LIMIT TO CONGRESS’S POWER UNDER 
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE:  LOPEZ AND MORRISON 
From the New Deal constitutional revolution of 193738 until 1995, the 
Supreme Court placed more emphasis on the need for a practical 
conception of the commerce power than on the need for a meaningful limit 
on Congress’s regulatory reach.39  As a result, Congress enjoyed such 
unrestricted freedom in legislating under this clause that Judge Alex 
Kozinski wondered why “anyone would make the mistake of calling it the 
Commerce Clause instead of the ‘Hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like 
Clause.’”40 
                                                 
 35. See discussion infra Part III.B (analyzing the Raich Court’s decision to uphold 
application of federal drug law to noncommercial cultivation and use of medical marijuana 
despite absence of congressional findings on impact of such activity on the national drug 
market). 
 36. See discussion infra Part IV.A (demonstrating that the macrocosmic approach 
allows federal regulation over intrastate, noncommercial criminal conduct as long as 
Congress drafts the statute broadly enough). 
 37. See discussion infra Part V (striking a balance between the two competing 
principles within the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence and imposing a reasonable 
limit on Congress’s regulatory power so that it does not extend to intrastate, noncommercial, 
criminal conduct with only an attenuated connection to interstate commerce). 
 38. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 3.3 
(2d ed. 2002) (explaining that the Court’s decisions in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), and Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), “expansively defined the scope of Congress’s commerce 
power”); id. (recognizing that, with these decisions, the Court formally abandoned the 
distinctions between “commerce and other stages of business” and between “direct and 
indirect effects on interstate commerce”). 
 39. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding the 
constitutionality of an as-applied challenge where the litigant, a loan shark, threatened to 
break the legs of a butcher because, as the Court held, loan sharking is part of organized 
crime, which substantially affects interstate commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294, 304-05 (1964) (finding that a federal law prohibiting racial discrimination may reach a 
local restaurant, even in absence of direct evidence demonstrating the connection between 
discriminatory restaurant service and the flow of food in interstate commerce); Wickard, 
314 U.S. at 128-29 (determining that the Agricultural Adjustment Act could extend to a 
farmer in Ohio who grew wheat for personal consumption). 
 40. Hon. Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
1, 5 (1995); see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 308 
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (lamenting that “one could easily get the sense from this 
Court’s opinions that the federal system exists only at the sufferance of Congress”); 
Mitchell S. Lustig, Rehnquist Court Redefines the Commerce Clause, N.Y.L.J. Aug. 28, 
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In the 1995 decision United States v. Lopez,41 however, the Supreme 
Court resurrected the competing principle that there must be a reasonable 
limit to Congress’s regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause to 
preserve the sovereignty of the States.42  In Lopez, the Court struck down 
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (“GFSZA”),43 which made gun 
possession in a school zone a federal criminal offense.44  The Court 
explained that the possession of a gun in a school zone was a criminal act 
that had “nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic 
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.”45 
To restore a meaningful limit on Congress’s commerce power,46 the 
Court declined to extend Congress’s regulatory authority to activity only 
remotely associated with economic productivity.47  In striking down the 
                                                 
2000, at 1 (observing that during the twentieth century the Supreme Court increasingly 
deferred to congressional judgment “if Congress determined that there was need for 
legislation to remedy a problem of national concern”); Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 
94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 691 (1995) (observing that “the Commerce Clause had become an 
intellectual joke”). 
 41. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 42. See id. at 561 n.3 (reiterating that under our dual system of government, the “States 
possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law” (quoting Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993))); see also Linda Greenhouse, The Rehnquist Court 
and Its Imperiled States’ Rights Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, § 4, at 3 (observing that 
the Rehnquist Court has issued “decisions that demanded a new respect for the sovereignty 
of the states and placed corresponding restrictions on the powers of Congress”). 
 43. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844-45 
(1990) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)) (1988 & Supp. V 1990), invalidated by Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, and amended by Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government 
Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 101(f), 110 Stat 3009, 369-70 (1996) 
(limiting GFSZA in the wake of Lopez to guns moving in or otherwise affecting interstate 
commerce) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2000)). 
 44. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (explaining that because the statute was “not an essential 
part of a larger regulation of economic activity,” it could not “be sustained under [the 
Court’s] cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a 
commercial transaction [that] substantially affects interstate commerce”). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Cf. id. at 584-85 (Thomas, J., concurring) (declaring that the Court has 
“always . . . rejected readings of the Commerce Clause . . . that would permit Congress to 
exercise a police power”); Casey L. Westover, Structural Interpretation and the New 
Federalism:  Finding the Proper Balance Between State Sovereignty and Federal 
Supremacy, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 693, 694 (2005) (recognizing that because there is no 
“federalism” clause, the Court has used “interpretative tools” “to justify its decisions”); id. 
(arguing that “the Constitution requires a balanced approach to federalism that takes account 
of two countervailing principles—state sovereignty and federal supremacy,” and that, in 
these recent cases, “the majority relies exclusively on the state sovereignty principle,” while 
“the dissenters . . . focus solely on the federal supremacy principle”). 
 47. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (declining to accept the Government’s “‘costs of crime’ 
reasoning” because, if accepted, “Congress could regulate . . . all violent crime” no matter 
“how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce”); id. (rejecting the Government’s 
“national productivity” reasoning since this would necessarily grant Congress the authority 
to regulate any activity, “including marriage, divorce, and child custody,” if it determined 
that the activity affected an individual’s economic productivity); see also United States v. 
Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1459 (6th Cir. 1995) (Boggs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (arguing that the Lopez Court applied a higher standard of review than the typical 
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GFSZA, the Court provided a framework for analyzing future Commerce 
Clause challenges.  Under this framework, Congress may regulate three 
broad categories under the commerce power:  (1) the “channels” of 
interstate commerce; (2) the “instrumentalities” of interstate commerce, 
including persons or things in interstate commerce; and, (3) activities that 
“substantially affect” interstate commerce.48 
Similarly, in United States v. Morrison,49 the Court held that Congress 
exceeded its commerce power in enacting the provision of the Violence 
Against Women Act50 that created a federal civil remedy for victims of 
gender-motivated violence.51  Section 13981 was suspect because it did not 
regulate an economic activity.52  The Court rejected the voluminous 
legislative findings purporting to demonstrate the effects of gender-
motivated violence on interstate commerce.53  The Court feared that if it 
accepted Congress’s “but-for” method of reasoning and upheld the 
provision, Congress’s regulatory reach would inevitably extend to activities 
with only a tenuous connection to interstate commerce.54  In declining to 
defer to Congress’s decision-making,55 the Court remarked that “simply 
because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially 
                                                 
rational basis test for evaluating the constitutionality of regulating noncommercial activity 
under the Commerce Clause); Dral & Phillips, supra note 18, at 616 (criticizing the Court’s 
approach because “the majority refuses to relinquish the rational basis test, [and yet] strikes 
down legislation with standards that clearly are stricter than rational basis”). 
 48. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. 
 49. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 50. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 102-322, 108 Stat. 1941 (1994) 
(providing under § 13981(c) that “[a] person . . . who commits a crime of violence 
motivated by gender . . . shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of 
compensatory and punitive damages”) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000)), 
invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 51. See generally Goldberg, infra note 58, at 581 (explaining that Congress enacted the 
civil rights provision in response to “widespread violence against women and because 
women were facing a pervasive inability to obtain recourse in state courts”). 
 52. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (declining to uphold the statute since gender-
motivated crimes are not economic in nature). 
 53. See id. at 615; see also H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, pt. 4, at 385 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), 
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839, 1853 (finding that such violence substantially affects 
interstate commerce by preventing victims from traveling, lowering employment levels in 
interstate business, increasing medical costs, and decreasing national productivity); S. REP. 
NO. 103-138, at 41 (1993) (estimating the total annual cost of domestic violence in the 
United States at between five and ten billion dollars); S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 37 (1990) 
(stating that over one million women seek medical attention annually for injuries stemming 
from domestic abuse (citation omitted)). 
 54. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16 (declining to accept the Government’s argument 
because if the Court permitted federal regulation of gender-motivated violence, Congress 
would not only be able to regulate all violent crimes, but also family law, since the 
economic impact of “marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national economy” cannot 
be denied). 
 55. See id. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for assigning “lesser 
value[]” to congressional findings and for implicitly “supplanting rational basis scrutiny 
with a new criterion of review”). 
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affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.”56 
After the Court’s decision in Morrison,57 scholars could no longer 
dismiss the Lopez decision as an anomaly58 within the Court’s Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence.59  On the contrary, the principle that there must be a 
reasonable limit to Congress’s commerce power enjoyed a renewed 
significance.60  Morrison clarified Lopez’s substantial effect category by 
providing a four-factor test.61  Arguably, the two most significant62 factors 
are whether the statute regulates economic or commercial activity, and 
whether the regulated activity has only an attenuated connection to 
interstate commerce.63  The two remaining factors consider whether the 
statute contains an “express jurisdictional element”64 that limits the reach of 
                                                 
 56. Id. at 614 (majority opinion) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 
(1995)). 
 57. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 58. Dral & Phillips, supra note 18, at 616; see also id. at 609-10 (adding that 
commentators disagreed on whether Lopez was merely a reminder that there was a limit to 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause or whether Lopez signaled “the beginning 
of a complete upheaval of the expansive [interpretation of the Commerce Clause] that had 
existed since 1937”); Jason Everett Goldberg, Comment, Substantial Activity and Non-
Economic Commerce:  Toward a New Theory of the Commerce Clause, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 563, 
566 (2001) (explaining that “following Lopez, speculation abounded in academic journals as 
to whether Lopez was an aberration or, rather, reflected a shift from a laissez-faire Supreme 
Court to a more activist Court when evaluating the constitutionality of statutes enacted 
under the Commerce Clause”). 
 59. See Dral & Phillips, supra note 18, at 616-17 (observing that, with Lopez, the Court 
departed from the jurisprudential trend of judicial deference to Congress under the 
Commerce Clause). 
 60. Cf. Randy E. Barnett, Is the Rehnquist Court an “Activist” Court? The Commerce 
Clause Cases, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1275, 1281 (2002) (advancing the theory that the results 
reached by the Rehnquist Court “are less activist than those of previous courts,” especially 
in the Rehnquist Court’s Commerce Clause decisions).  But see Christopher E. Smith & 
Avis Alexandria Jones, The Rehnquist Court’s Activism and the Risk of Injustice, 26 CONN. 
L. REV. 53, 57 (1993) (arguing that despite the Justices’ lip service to “judicial 
conservatism,” the Rehnquist Court is actually an activist court). 
 61. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-12 (summarizing the Lopez analysis as focusing on:  (1) 
whether the criminal statute has anything to do with commerce; (2) whether the statute 
contains a jurisdictional element establishing Congress’ regulation of interstate commerce; 
(3) whether the statute’s legislative history contains express congressional findings on the 
regulated activity’s impact on interstate commerce; and (4) whether the relationship 
between the regulated activity and interstate commerce is attenuated). 
 62. See United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (beginning the 
analysis of an as-applied challenge based on the Commerce Clause with consideration of the 
commercial or economic nature of the conduct at issue and the degree of attenuation 
between the conduct and interstate commerce because, according to the court, conduct that 
fails to satisfy these two factors automatically fails the entire test, as such conduct would fall 
outside the scope of Congress’s commerce power). 
 63. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-12; see also United States v. Visnich, 109 F. Supp. 2d 
757, 760 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (recognizing that Morrison placed more emphasis on the 
connection between the regulated activity and interstate commerce). 
 64. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-12 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562); see also Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 561 (explaining that the presence of a jurisdictional element in a statute would help 
the Court determine “through case-by-case inquiry” that the activity at issue affects 
interstate commerce). 
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its provisions,65 and whether Congress made findings regarding the 
regulated activity’s impact on interstate commerce.66 
The Court’s decisions in Lopez and Morrison demonstrated that 
Congress’s era of unfettered regulatory power was over.67 Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist, who authored both opinions, drew a sharp distinction 
between economic and non-economic activity:  “Where economic activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity 
will be sustained.”68  While Rehnquist declined to adopt a “categorical 
rule” against aggregating non-economic activity, he stressed that the Court 
has “upheld Commerce Clause regulation of [aggregated] intrastate activity 
only where that activity [was] economic in nature.”69 
What this distinction between economic and non-economic activity 
meant for as-applied challenges, however, remained unclear.70  Would it be 
determinative if the particular litigants’ conduct was noncommercial?71  Or, 
would the noncommercial nature of the litigants’ conduct be irrelevant as 
long as the statute generally regulated commercial activity?72  Lopez and 
Morrison did not say.73  Consequently, lower courts did not come to a 
                                                 
 65. But see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 657-59 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
efficacy of the jurisdictional element in protecting the federalism concerns addressed in 
Morrison since most products, or their integral parts, cross interstate lines); Diane 
McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and Morrison:  
The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1675, 1680 
(2002) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the jurisdictional hook, and arguing that 
the “state-line crossing requirement does not impose meaningful limits on congressional 
regulation”). 
 66. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612. 
 67. See id. at 618 (finding “no better example of the police power, which the Founders 
denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent 
crime and vindication of its victims”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (recognizing that the 
Constitution does not grant Congress a “plenary police power”); see also Elizabeth S. 
Saylor, Federalism and the Family After Morrison:  An Examination of the Child Support 
Recovery Act, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, and a Federal Law Outlawing 
Gun Possession by Domestic Abusers, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 68 (2002) (interpreting 
the Lopez and Morrison decisions as attempts to establish a “limiting principle” on 
congressional power). 
 68. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560). 
 69. Id. at 613; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (admitting that a “determination whether 
an intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal 
uncertainty”). 
 70. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2209 (2005) (explaining that facial 
challenges narrowly limited the question in Lopez and Morrison to whether a certain subject 
matter falls within the regulatory reach of Congress’s commerce power, thereby excluding 
the question of whether facially valid regulations may extend to all persons that Congress 
intended such regulations to govern). 
 71. See discussion infra Part II (illustrating that the macrocosmic approach and 
microcosmic approach diverge on this issue). 
 72. See discussion infra Part II (explaining that this criteria is sufficient for finding the 
statute constitutional as applied to a litigant under the macrocosmic approach, but is 
insufficient under the microcosmic approach). 
 73. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20 (explaining that because the Court upheld 
the litigants’ facial challenges to the statute, the Court did not provide adequate guidance for 
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consensus in deciding which level of generality was appropriate to evaluate 
the regulated activity under an as-applied challenge.74  Some courts looked 
at the litigants’ conduct specifically,75 while other courts looked at the 
statute generally.76 
II. THE DIFFICULTY IN RESOLVING AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES AFTER 
LOPEZ AND MORRISON:  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING THE INTRASTATE 
PRODUCTION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
The courts’ lack of consensus in deciding which level of generality was 
appropriate is readily apparent in the context of as-applied challenges to 
CPPA, which proscribes the production of child pornography made with 
materials that have traveled through interstate commerce.77  Under the 
macrocosmic approach, courts focused on whether the statute regulated 
economic activity.78  Under the microcosmic approach, however, courts 
focused on whether the particular litigants’ conduct was economic in 
nature.79  This discrepancy led courts to reach opposite outcomes based 
                                                 
resolving as-applied challenges). 
 74. See Brief for Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 4, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (No. 03-1454), 2004 WL 2336485, 
available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/03-1454/03-
1454.mer.ami.cls.pdf (arguing that “[t]he level of generality issue is actually a red herring, 
prompted by a common misinterpretation of [Wickard], as involving noncommercial 
activity”). 
 75. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2005) (declining to 
look beyond the defendant’s intrastate, noncommercial, criminal conduct in evaluating the 
as-applied challenge), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005) (remanding for reconsideration in 
light of Raich); United States v. Matthews, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1228, 1237-38 (N.D. Ala. 
2004) (holding that § 2251(a) cannot reach the defendant’s intrastate, noncommercial, 
criminal conduct because he produced the child pornography without an “intention to sell, 
distribute, or exchange” the depictions); United States v. Jeronimo-Bautista, 319 F. Supp. 2d 
1272, 1279, 1282 (D. Utah 2004) (refusing to classify the defendant’s activity as economic 
because he did not intend to sell, distribute, or exchange the material), rev’d, 425 F.3d 1266 
(10th Cir. 2005) (remanding for reconsideration in light of Raich). 
 76. See, e.g., United States v. Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(rejecting defendant’s as-applied challenge on the grounds that he did not sell, distribute or 
exchange the child pornography because his actions fell within “a class of activities that 
substantially affects interstate commerce”), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2929 (2005). 
 77. The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 provides that: 
Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor 
to engage in . . . sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual 
depiction of such conduct[] shall be punished as provided under subsection 
(d), . . . if that visual depiction was produced using material that have been mailed, 
shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (2000). 
 78. See Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 17 (rejecting defendant’s as-applied challenge 
on the grounds that he did not sell, distribute or exchange the child pornography because it 
is immaterial if the defendant’s personal activities do not affect interstate commerce as long 
as his activity falls within a class of activities that substantially affects interstate commerce). 
 79. See, e.g., Smith, 402 F.3d at 1317 (declining to look beyond the defendant’s 
intrastate, noncommercial criminal conduct in evaluating the as-applied challenge); 
Matthews, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 (holding that § 2251(a) cannot reach the defendant’s 
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upon similar facts.80 
A. The Macrocosmic Approach:  United States v. Morales-De Jesús 
Elvin Tomás Morales-De Jesús was convicted under § 2251(a) for using 
materials transported in interstate commerce to make a video of his 
sexually explicit encounters with his thirteen-year-old god-daughter.81  The 
defendant argued that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to his 
noncommercial conduct82 because he did not “purchase, trade, sell or 
barter”83 the self-generated pornography.84  Thus, the court had to decide 
whether Congress could reach the defendant’s noncommercial conduct by 
enacting a broad regulatory scheme85 aimed at eliminating the lucrative 
national market in child pornography.86 
                                                 
intrastate, noncommercial criminal conduct because he produced the child pornography 
without an intention to “sell, distribute, or exchange” the depictions); Jeronimo-Bautista, 
319 F. Supp. 2d at 1279 (refusing to classify the defendant’s activity as economic because 
he did not intend to sell, distribute, or exchange the material). 
 80. See discussion infra Part II (demonstrating how the First Circuit in Morales-De 
Jesús denied the defendant’s as-applied challenge by employing the macrocosmic approach, 
and how the Eleventh Circuit in Smith upheld the defendant’s as-applied challenge by 
employing the microcosmic approach). 
 81. Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 7-8.  During two encounters, the defendant used 
materials and equipment transported in interstate commerce to videotape the sexual 
encounters.  Id. at 8. 
 82. The defendant also asserted a facial challenge to the statute, which the Court 
rejected.  Id. at 8, 17. 
 83. Id. at 17. 
 84. Compare id. at 17 (announcing that the commercial requirement does not depend 
upon a particular defendant’s intent to introduce the child pornography into commerce), 
with United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding litigant’s as-
applied challenge to part of a federal statute that proscribes the possession of child 
pornography because the litigant did not distribute, sell, or exchange the depiction), and 
United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325, 325-26, 332 (6th Cir. 2001) (reversing defendant’s 
conviction because defendant was not involved, and did not intend to be involved in the 
distribution or sharing of pornographic photos). 
 85. See Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 17 (explaining that a defendant’s as-applied 
challenge that his conduct does not affect interstate commerce will fail if his activity falls 
within the class of activities regulated that does substantially affect interstate commerce).  
See generally Alex Kreit, Why is Congress Still Regulating Noncommercial Activity?, 28 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 169, 172 (2004) (arguing that most lower court opinions treat a 
broad regulatory statute as “little more than a truism[,] if Congress has the power to enact 
larger scheme X and statute Y is connected to or part of that scheme, then Congress has the 
authority to enact statute Y”).  The Second Circuit in United States v. Holston, 343 F.3d 83, 
84-85, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2003) also employed the macrocosmic approach when dismissing the 
defendant’s as-applied challenge, in which the defendant argued that he had not distributed 
nor intended to distribute videotapes depicting sexual acts between the defendant and two 
girls, ages ten and fourteen.  Like the First Circuit in Morales-De Jesús, the Second Circuit 
stressed that because § 2251(a) was part of a broad regulatory scheme dedicated to 
eliminating child pornography, it was irrelevant that the defendant did not ship the materials 
interstate or intend to benefit commercially from his activity.  Id. at 90-91. 
 86. See Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 19-20 (arguing that the Sixth Circuit in Corp and 
the Ninth Circuit in McCoy inappropriately relied on the absence of an intent to distribute 
the depictions in commerce, but were correct in assessing the minor’s age and the absence 
of “predatory exploitation” as appropriate factors in determining as-applied challenges to 
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The First Circuit attempted to reconcile this position by focusing on the 
need for a practical understanding of the commerce power.87  
Consequently, the First Circuit adopted the macrocosmic approach, and 
determined that Congress’s power to criminalize conduct turns on the 
economic nature of the “class of conduct defined in the statute” and not on 
the economic facts of a particular case.88  With this premise in place, the 
Morales-De Jesús court interpreted Lopez and Morrison’s determinative 
distinction—that activity could be aggregated only where the conduct was 
commercial in nature89—as merely requiring that the general subject of the 
statute90 regulate commercial activity.91 
In focusing exclusively on the principle that Congress should regulate 
based upon broad principles of economic practicality, the court was 
deferential to congressional findings92 purporting to show how individuals, 
like the defendant, affected the national child pornography market.93  Under 
                                                 
the statute). 
 87. See id. at 17 (explaining that it is often necessary to regulate “local behavior to 
ensure the effectiveness of interstate regulation” (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1937))). 
 88. Id. at 18 (emphasis added); see id. at 17 (finding that where “a general regulatory 
statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual 
instances arising under that statute is of no consequence” (quoting United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (internal citation omitted))). 
 89. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (permitting Congress to extend reach 
of the Commerce Clause to a single farm’s production and consumption of wheat); see also 
Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 15 (finding that Wickard was applicable to child 
pornography cases because the intrastate possession and production of child pornography 
“through repetition elsewhere” helps to create and sustain the child pornography market 
(quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995))). 
 90. See Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 15 (“Even if appellee’s activity be local and 
though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by 
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce . . . .” (quoting 
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 (1942)) (alteration in original)); see also id. at 16 (observing that 
there is a “‘subtle transformation at work’” in applying the Wickard aggregation principle in 
contexts “where the ‘homegrown’ production and consumption of a commodity does not 
necessarily substitute for a commercially produced version that the defendant would 
otherwise have purchased in the marketplace” (quoting United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 
465, 476 (3d Cir. 1999))). 
 91. See id. at 19-20 (drawing on Lopez, where the Court did not frame its analysis 
around a high-school student bringing a gun to school, but around firearm possession in a 
school zone, and Morrison, where the Court discussed gender-motivated crimes of violence, 
and not the rape of a freshman college student, to support its macrocosmic interpretation). 
 92. See id. at 11; see also Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
591, 100 Stat. 3341-74 (finding child pornography to be a “multi-million dollar industry”); 
H.R. REP. NO. 105-557, at 27 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.S.C.A.N. 678, 695 (explaining 
that Congress intended the 1998 amendment to the CPPA to establish federal jurisdiction 
over persons producing child pornography with materials that had traveled through 
interstate commerce because the statute could not previously reach persons not intending to 
transport the resulting image in interstate commerce); H.R. REP. NO. 98-536, at 10 (1983), 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.S.C.A.N. 492, 501 (noting that many who distribute child 
pornography do so without any “commercial motive”). 
 93. See Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 17, 20 (explaining that the Government is not 
required to prove that the defendant’s particular actions had an effect on interstate 
commerce, but only that the defendant produced a depiction of child pornography that 
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this deferential approach, the First Circuit focused on Congress’s finding 
that child pornography is frequently homegrown,94 rather than on 
Congress’s failure to provide any evidence as to how noncommercial actors 
who do not trade, distribute, or sell their self-generated pornography affect 
this national market.95 
B. The Microcosmic Approach:  United States v. Smith 
Alvin Smith was convicted of violating § 2251(a) for taking sexually 
explicit photographs of minor girls.96  The defendant challenged the 
constitutionality of the statute as applied to his conduct because he had not 
distributed, traded, or sold the material.97  Thus, like the First Circuit in 
Morales-De Jesús, the Eleventh Circuit had to reconcile a statute that 
regulates commercial activity with the defendant’s noncommercial 
conduct.98  Unlike the court in Morales-De Jesús, however, the court in 
Smith focused on the alternate Commerce Clause principle:  that the 
preservation of our dual system of government99 requires a meaningful 
limit to Congress’s commerce power.100  In so doing,101 the Eleventh 
                                                 
“could find its way into the national market for pornography”) (emphasis added). 
 94. See id. at 11, 16-17 (observing that “[g]enerally, the domestic material is of the 
‘homemade’ variety, while the imported material is produced by commercial dealers” 
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 98-536, at 17, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 508)). 
 95. See id. at 16 (arguing that because much of the child pornography Congress seeks to 
regulate is homegrown and difficult to trace, Congress can proscribe the local production 
that feeds the national market, “as this production substantially affects interstate commerce” 
(quoting United States v. Holston, 343 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2003))). 
 96. United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303, 1315-16 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated, 125 S. 
Ct. 2938 (2005) (remanding the case to be considered in light of Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. 
Ct. 2195 (2005)).  Investigators were able to locate a girl who was in a number of the 
photos.  Id. at 1310.  At the time of the photos, she was fourteen years old.  Id.  The federal 
prosecutor was able to indict the defendant for his conduct under § 2251(a) because the film, 
photo paper, and film processor the defendant used to produce the pictures had traveled in 
interstate commerce.  Id. at 1309. 
 97. Id. at 1310, 1313-14.  While investigating the defendant’s brother on suspicion of 
possession and distribution of drugs, the police uncovered a lockbox belonging to the 
defendant.  Id. at 1310.  The lockbox contained numerous pornographic photographs.  Id.  
Although many of the pictures were of women over eighteen years of age, some pictures 
contained what appeared to be “very, very young girls” engaged in sexually explicit conduct 
with the defendant.  Id. 
 98. See discussion supra Part II.A (describing how the Morales-De Jesús court 
employed the macrocosmic approach to address the defendant’s challenge that a statute 
regulating commercial activity generally was unconstitutional as applied to his 
noncommercial conduct). 
 99. See Smith, 402 F.3d at 1328 (acknowledging that the court’s holding limits the 
federal government’s ability to prosecute intrastate producers and possessors of child 
pornography, defending this approach by explaining that the Constitution simply does not 
provide a national police power, and emphasizing that Congress’s regulatory power under 
the Commerce Clause is limited to cases involving “[c]ommerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3)). 
 100. See id. at 1315-16 (prefacing its analysis with the principle that “Congress can 
legislate only within the ambit of the specific powers the Constitution confers on it” 
(quoting United States v. Maxwell, 386 F.3d 1042, 1053-54 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 
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Circuit employed the microcosmic approach by focusing on the defendant’s 
“intrastate, noncommercial production of child pornography.”102 
In framing its analysis on the principle that Congress’s regulatory power 
should not infringe upon State sovereignty,103 the court construed Lopez 
and Morrison’s determinative distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial activity as requiring that the defendant’s individual conduct 
be commercial to justify aggregation under Wickard.104  In Wickard, the 
Court upheld Congress’s ability to regulate the production of wheat on a 
single farm because cumulatively homegrown wheat had a substantial 
impact on the supply and demand of the commodity in the national 
market.105  Because the Eleventh Circuit found nothing “commercial or 
economic” about producing pornography for one’s own consumption,106 
the court declined to aggregate this activity with others similarly situated.107  
The Eleventh Circuit supported its interpretation by emphasizing a 
fundamental difference between the purpose of the statute in Wickard and 
that of § 2251(a).108  Although the statute in Wickard was concerned with 
controlling a national crop that had significant implications for the national 
economy,109 § 2251(a) seeks to end the sexual exploitation of children110 
                                                 
126 S. Ct. 85 (2005) (denying Maxwell’s petition), and vacated, 126 S. Ct. 321 (2005) 
(granting the government’s petition and remanding for reconsideration in light of Raich))). 
 101. See id. at 1328 (“The federalist system places a vital check on the power of the 
central government to trespass on our freedom. Federalism ensures a role for the 
governments of the states and affords the voting public a more resonant voice in the debate 
over many legislative issues of principally local concern.” (quoting Maxwell, 386 F.3d at 
1069)). 
 102. Id. at 1316-17. 
 103. The court reasoned: 
The real issue at this point in the case is whether Smith should remain in federal 
prison for committing acts that the Federal Government lacks the constitutional 
power to criminalize simply because we think his punishment is deserved. 
Ultimately, we think that it would undermine public confidence in the judicial 
system to so blatantly brush aside the limits our Constitution places on the Federal 
Government . . . . 
Id. at 1328. 
 104. Id. at 1317-18. 
 105. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-29. 
 106. Smith, 402 F.3d at 1317 (quoting Maxwell, 386 F.3d at 1056). 
 107. See id. at 1318 (arguing that to aggregate the defendant’s conduct would be to 
expand Congress’s regulatory reach “beyond what the Supreme Court has suggested to be 
its outer limits”). 
 108. Id. at 1320; see id. at 1318 (finding that Wickard was distinguishable since that 
statute was “far more obviously a regulation of commerce”). 
 109. Id. at 1317-18 (arguing that the statute at issue in Wickard was far more a regulation 
of commerce than § 2251(a) because the consumption of homegrown wheat was “the most 
variable factor” affecting the national wheat market and without regulating this segment, 
“wheat prices would have been greatly affected by the world market” (quoting Wickard v. 
Filburn, 314 U.S. 111, 127 (1942))). 
 110. See id. at 1319 (declaring that the “vast majority” of congressional findings merely 
support the premise that child pornography is harmful to children (quoting Maxwell, 386 
F.3d at 1067)). 
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and is not concerned with regulating the child pornography market for its 
interstate commercial implications.111  In fact, because § 2251(a)’s primary 
purpose is to control conduct,112 the court found that § 2251(a) closely 
resembles the statutes struck down by the Supreme Court in Lopez and 
Morrison.113  The Eleventh Circuit rejected the premise that Congress’s 
regulatory reach may extend to purely local criminal conduct114 by enacting 
a sweeping regulatory scheme aimed at extinguishing the child 
pornography market without showing how the defendant, and others 
similarly situated, substantially affected this national market.115  By 
following Lopez and Morrison’s use of a heightened level of scrutiny when 
reviewing congressional findings,116 the Smith court declined to infer that 
those who produce child pornography noncommercially would sell, trade, 
or distribute the material so as to affect this national market.117 
                                                 
 111. See Smith, 402 F.3d at 1318 (explaining that the statute is not interested in the 
“supply of child pornography for the purpose of avoiding surpluses and shortages [nor is the 
statute concerned with] stimulating its trade at increased prices” (quoting Maxwell, 386 F.3d 
at 1057)). 
 112. See id. (noting that Congress attempted “to regulate primary conduct directly, even 
within state borders” through § 2251(a) (quoting Maxwell, 386 F.3d at 1057)). 
 113. See id. (declaring that similar to the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison, 
§ 2251(a) is not concerned with commerce “however broadly one might define [that] 
term[]” (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995))). 
 114. See Smith, 402 F.3d at 1320 (arguing that because the causal chain necessary to link 
the defendant’s activity to a substantial impact on interstate commerce is extremely 
attenuated, the defendant’s conduct is beyond Congress’s commerce power); see also id. at 
1328 (“[E]very guarantee enshrined in the Constitution, our basic charter and the guarantor 
of our most precious liberties, is by it endowed with an independent vitality and value, and 
this Court is not free to curtail those constitutional guarantees even to punish the most 
obviously guilty.” (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 524 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting))). 
 115. Compare id. at 1319 (finding that the congressional findings support nothing more 
than the fact that a market for child pornography exists), with United States v. Morales-De 
Jesús, 372 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 2004) (concluding that Congress made specific findings about 
the need to eliminate the national market in child pornography by prohibiting its production 
at the local level), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2929 (2005). 
 116. Compare Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (dismissing the voluminous legislative findings 
purporting to show the effect of gender-motivated crimes on interstate commerce because 
the fact that Congress concludes that an activity “substantially affects interstate commerce 
does not necessarily make it so” (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2)), with Smith, 402 F.3d 
at 1323 (declining to infer that the defendant distributed the child pornography and 
emphasizing that the government provided no evidence that the defendant purchased, 
traded, or distributed the child pornography). 
 117. See Smith, 402 F.3d at 1320 (equating the congressional findings offered to support 
federal jurisdiction over the intrastate production and possession of child pornography for 
one’s own consumption as the “equivalent of saying that Congress can . . . regulate 
backyard cookouts simply because a multibillion-dollar interstate restaurant industry exists,” 
but accepting that the congressional findings may support the proposition that intrastate 
commercial producers and persons who distribute child pornography non-commercially 
affect interstate commerce). 
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III. AN UNSATISFYING SOLUTION:  GONZALES V. RAICH 
The Supreme Court recently faced the difficult issue of deciding the 
constitutional boundaries for as-applied challenges. In Gonzales v. Raich,118 
the Court ruled on a Commerce Clause challenge to the Controlled 
Substances Act (“CSA”)119 as applied to the litigants’ intrastate possession, 
cultivation, and use of marijuana for medical treatment.120  Although the 
Ninth Circuit in Ashcroft v. Raich121 took the microcosmic approach,122 the 
Supreme Court adopted the macrocosmic approach in resolving this as-
applied challenge.123  Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court vacated Smith, 
remanded it for reconsideration in light of its holding in Raich, and made 
clear that the macroscopic approach employed by Morales-De Jesús would 
govern future as-applied challenges to the regulation of intrastate 
production of child pornography for personal use.124 
A. Ashcroft v. Raich:  The Ninth Circuit Employs                                  the 
Microcosmic Approach 
In seeking to preserve as-applied challenges and the distinction between 
“what is national and what is local,”125 the Ninth Circuit, like the Eleventh 
Circuit in Smith,126 employed the microcosmic approach.127  In so doing, 
                                                 
 118. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
 119. See 21 U.S.C. § 801 (regulating the production, distribution, and possession of 
controlled substances); see also Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2210 (explaining that the Act is 
“designed to foster the beneficial use of those medications, to prevent their misuse, and to 
prohibit entirely the possession or use of substances listed in Schedule I”). 
 120. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2199, 2201. 
 121. 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
 122. See id. at 1228-29 (explaining that the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and use 
of marijuana for medical purposes can be properly defined as a “separate class of activity” 
from the conduct regulated by the statute generally since this particular class of activities 
does not involve “sale, exchange, or distribution”). 
 123. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209, 2213 (implying that the enforcement difficulties that 
may be created in providing an exemption to those who cultivate and use marijuana for 
medical purposes is sufficient for deferring to Congress’s conclusion that the regulation of 
intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana is necessary to regulate the national 
market in controlled substances effectively). 
 124. See discussion infra Part III.C (explaining how future as-applied challenges to § 
2251(a) will be resolved). 
 125. See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1233 (explaining that since medical marijuana cultivated and 
used for one’s own consumption does not have any “obvious” effect on interstate 
commerce, federal regulation of such conduct “considerably blur[s] the distinction between 
what is national and what is local” (quoting Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 647 (9th Cir. 
2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring))). 
 126. See discussion supra Part II.B (explaining that the issue is not whether the 
defendant’s conduct is deserving of punishment, but whether Congress, without a national 
police power, can reach the defendant’s intrastate, noncommercial criminal conduct). 
 127. See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1234 (following the principle that state power is 
“preeminent” in the area of criminal law and national authority in that sphere must be 
limited only to the areas where interstate commerce is substantially affected (citing United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000); United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1124 
(9th Cir. 2003))). 
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the court distinguished the litigants’ noncommercial cultivation, use, and 
possession of marijuana for medical purposes128 from the broader drug 
market129 because the litigants did not sell, exchange, or distribute the 
marijuana.130 
The Ninth Circuit interpreted Lopez and Morrison’s distinction between 
commercial and noncommercial activity as requiring that the litigants’ 
conduct be commercial to permit aggregation under Wickard.131  
Consequently, the court declined to aggregate the litigants’ activity with 
others similarly situated to support the premise that the litigants’ activity 
substantially affected the national drug market.132  In fact, the Ninth Circuit 
stressed the attenuated connection that the litigants’ activity had on 
interstate commerce133 by adhering to Lopez and Morrison’s use of a 
heightened level of scrutiny134 when reviewing congressional findings135 
                                                 
 128. Id. at 1230 (relying on McCoy, where the court upheld an as-applied challenge to 
the federal statute criminalizing the possession of child pornography after finding a single 
photograph to be clearly distinct from the economic nature of the child pornography market, 
to support its conclusion that the litigants’ conduct was not commercial); see id. at 1231 n.5 
(condemning a recent district court’s decision, County of Santa Cruz v. Ashcroft, 279 F. 
Supp. 2d 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2003), because the court failed to ask whether the statute, as 
applied to the litigant’s particular class of activity, regulates commerce). 
 129. See id. at 1230 (distinguishing the medical marijuana at issue from the broader 
illicit drug market because the medical marijuana is never intended for, nor does it enter, the 
interstate drug market); see also United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303, 1317 (11th Cir. 
2005) (treating the non-economic, criminal nature of the defendant’s behavior as central to 
the court’s decision), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005); McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1115 (upholding 
defendant’s as-applied challenge to a federal statute criminalizing the possession of child 
pornography because the defendant never entered nor intended to enter the depiction into 
the larger interstate market); United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325, 332 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(upholding the defendant’s as-applied challenge to a statute proscribing the possession of 
child pornography because the defendant did not distribute nor intend to distribute the 
pornography). 
 130. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1230 (employing a definition of commercial activity that 
encompasses the “exchange of goods and services, [especially] on a large scale involving 
transportation between cities, states, and nations” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 263 
(7th ed. 1999))). 
 131. See id. at 1232 (arguing that because the aggregation principle is applied only in 
cases where the activity is of an apparent commercial character, it should not be employed 
in the instant case because the litigants’ activity lacks the essential elements of commercial 
activity). 
 132. Id. at 1230; see also Smith, 402 F.3d at 1317-18 (declining to aggregate the 
defendant’s conduct with others similarly situated as his conduct was not commercial). 
 133. Compare Raich, 352 F.3d at 1233 (acknowledging that although the intrastate 
cultivation, possession, and use of medical marijuana could affect interstate commerce by 
lowering the demand for marijuana from the interstate market, it was not at all clear that the 
effect would be substantial), with Smith, 402 F.3d at 1321-22 (describing the nexus between 
the intrastate, noncommercial conduct engaged in by the defendant and the impact on the 
interstate market of child pornography as “exceedingly attenuated”). 
 134. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (“[S]imply because Congress 
may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not 
necessarily make it so.” (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995) 
(citation omitted))). 
 135. See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1232 (reiterating that Morrison “counsels courts to take 
congressional findings with a grain of salt”). 
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purporting to show a sufficient nexus between the activity regulated by the 
statute and interstate commerce.136  Because Congress did not provide 
findings specific to marijuana,137 including the noncommercial use of 
marijuana for medicinal purposes,138 the Ninth Circuit found that the 
litigants’ connection to interstate commerce was exceedingly attenuated139 
and thus that the CSA was “likely unconstitutional” as applied to them.140 
B. Gonzales v. Raich:  The Macrocosmic Approach Prevails 
Instead of striking a balance between the two competing Commerce 
Clause principles, the Supreme Court approached the litigants’ as-applied 
challenge141 by focusing exclusively142 on the importance of sustaining 
federal legislation based upon broad principles of economic practicality.143  
Consequently, the Court employed the macrocosmic approach, similar to 
                                                 
 136. See id. at 1230 n.4 (declining to infer that the litigants’ marijuana could be sold in 
the marketplace and thus may have a substantial impact on the interstate drug market). 
 137. See id. at 1233 (dismissing the congressional findings as insufficient to provide the 
court with guidance in determining why the federal regulation should extend to the 
litigants). 
 138. See id. at 1232 (reasoning that Congress could not have considered the “intrastate 
medicinal use of marijuana that is not bought or sold” when making findings relating to the 
“[l]ocal distribution and possession of controlled substances”). 
 139. Id. at 1233 (conceding that the intrastate cultivation and use of medical marijuana 
could have an effect on interstate commerce in that it may reduce the demand for marijuana 
that is moved interstate, but declining to find that the effect would be substantial); see also 
Smith, 402 F.3d at 1320 (equating the Government’s argument that the congressional 
findings support federal jurisdiction over defendant’s individualized conduct with saying 
that Congress has federal jurisdiction over “backyard cookouts simply because a 
multibillion-dollar interstate restaurant industry exists”). 
 140. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1234. 
 141. Compare Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2209 (2005) (arguing that the fact 
that the litigants ask the Court to “excise individual applications” of a valid regulatory 
scheme is “pivotal” because where the class of activities regulated is within the ambit of 
Congress’s commerce power, the courts cannot exempt individuals whose conduct falls 
within the larger class of activities), with United States v. Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d 6, 17 
(1st Cir. 2004) (explaining that a defendant’s as-applied challenge will fail if his activity 
falls within a class of activities that substantially affects interstate commerce), cert. denied, 
125 S. Ct. 2929 (2005). 
 142. Compare Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205 (prefacing its analysis with an explanation of the 
historical development and congressional expansion of the commerce power “in response to 
rapid industrial development and an increasingly interdependent national economy”), and 
id. at 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the analysis should place significantly more 
weight on Congress’s determination that it needs to regulate private activity than whether 
the statute regulates an area traditionally left to the states), with Raich, 352 F.3d at 1234 
(prefacing its analysis with the principle that state power is “preeminent” in the area of 
criminal law and national authority in that sphere must be limited only to the areas where 
interstate commerce is substantially affected). 
 143. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2210 n.35 (arguing that the precedent set by Lopez did not 
change the Court’s practical understanding of the commerce power and that Congress may 
regulate on the “assumption that we have a single market and a unified purpose to build a 
stable national economy” (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 574 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring))); see also id. at 2206 (declaring that when Congress chooses to 
regulate the “total incidence” of a practice that may threaten the national market, Congress 
can regulate the entire class (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971))). 
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the First Circuit in Morales-De Jesús,144 and held that Congress acted 
within its authority when it regulated the litigants’ conduct as part of its 
power to regulate interstate markets for controlled substances.145 
The Raich Court employed an expansive definition of commercial 
activity.  While previous Court holdings used a definition of commerce that 
involved “sell[ing], barter[ing], or exchang[ing],”146 the majority instead 
opted for a much broader definition by arguing that economic activity 
includes the “production, distribution, and consumption of 
commodities.”147 
The Court agreed with the First Circuit’s decision in Morales-De Jesús 
that only the general subject of the statute need be commercial for 
aggregating the litigants’ conduct148 under Wickard.149  Under this 
interpretation, Congress could reach the litigants’ local and noncommercial 
activity since their activity was part of “an economic ‘class of activities’ 
that ha[s] a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”150  In fact, Wickard 
is central to the analysis under the macrocosmic approach.151  As noted in 
                                                 
 144. Compare id. at 2206 (arguing that Wickard permits Congress to regulate intrastate, 
noncommercial activity as long as Congress concludes that the failure to regulate that 
activity threatens its ability to regulate the interstate market in that commodity effectively), 
with Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 17 (supporting its analysis with the principle that it is 
often necessary to control local behavior to regulate interstate commerce effectively). 
 145. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2201 (finding that the Ninth Circuit improperly 
distinguished the litigants’ noncommercial, intrastate cultivation and use of medical 
marijuana from the larger commercial market). 
 146. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 119 (1942).  Lopez and Morrison both 
recognized that Wickard was “perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause 
authority over intrastate activity.”  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) 
(quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560). 
 147. Compare Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966)), and Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 16 
(determining that an activity is economic as long as it creates a product for which there is a 
national market), with Raich, 352 F.3d at 1228 (explaining that the cultivation and use of 
marijuana for medicinal purposes is not commercial activity because it lacks the essential 
elements of commerce, namely sale, exchange, or distribution). 
 148. Compare Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206 (arguing that Wickard stands for the notion that 
Congress may regulate noncommercial intrastate activity if it determines that regulating 
such activity is necessary in order to effectively regulate the interstate market for a product), 
with Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 20 (interpreting Lopez and Morrison as merely 
requiring that the general subject of the statute, and not the litigant’s particular activity, be 
commercial in nature). 
 149. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205-06 (“Even if appellee’s activity be local and though it 
may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress 
if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.” (quoting Wickard, 317 
U.S. at 129)). 
 150. Id. at 2205 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1971)).  The Court 
further explained that when “a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to 
commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no 
consequence.”  Id. at 2206 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968)); see 
also Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 17 (finding that Congress’s power to criminalize 
conduct turns on the economic nature of a class of activities defined in the statute, and not 
on the economic facts of a particular case). 
 151. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207 (emphasizing that as homegrown wheat “tend[ed] to 
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Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Raich, Congress may regulate the litigants’ 
local and noncommercial cultivation and consumption of marijuana 
because, when aggregated with others similarly situated, this activity may 
affect the supply and demand of controlled substances152 in the interstate 
market.153  Thus, as the homegrown wheat in Wickard “tend[ed] to 
frustrate” the federal interest in protecting and stabilizing the interstate 
market, an exemption for homegrown marijuana “tends to frustrate” the 
federal interest in eliminating154 the interstate illicit drug market.155 
Unlike the Wickard Court, the Raich Court could not rely on specific 
findings demonstrating how the regulation of the litigants’ activity was 
essential to the effective regulation of the interstate market.156  To 
overcome a lack of Congressional findings157 purporting to show how 
noncommercial, intrastate producers and consumers of homegrown 
                                                 
frustrate the federal interest in stabilizing prices by regulating the volume of commercial 
transactions in the interstate market, the diversion of homegrown marijuana tends to 
frustrate the federal interest in eliminating commercial transactions in the interstate market 
in their entirety”); Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 15 (asserting that Wickard was applicable 
to child pornography cases because the intrastate possession and production of child 
pornography “through repetition elsewhere” helps to create and sustain the child 
pornography market (quoting United States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 652, 656 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(internal quotation omitted))). 
 152. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208 n.31 (noting that “[t]he Executive Office of the 
President has estimated that in 2000 American users spent $10.5 billion on the purchase of 
marijuana” (citation omitted)). 
 153. See id. at 2219 (Scalia, J., concurring) (contending that controlled substances 
produced and distributed intrastate are indistinguishable from those produced and 
distributed interstate and that marijuana cultivated and possessed for personal use is “never 
more than an instant from the interstate market”).  Justice Scalia also declared that Congress 
is well within its authority in declining to accept the premise that state law will be effective 
in maintaining the distinction between the lawful market in marijuana for medicinal 
purposes and the larger marijuana market.  Id. at 2220. 
 154. See id. at 2219 (reaffirming that the power to prohibit commerce in a particular 
product is well within the ambit of Congress’s commerce power). 
 155. In Raich, the Court commented: 
One need not have degree in economics to understand why a nationwide exemption 
for the vast quantity of marijuana (or other drugs) locally cultivated for personal 
use (which presumably would include use by friends, neighbors, and family 
members) may have a substantial impact on the interstate market for this 
extraordinarily popular substance. 
125 S. Ct. at 2212. 
 156. See Ashcroft v. Raich, 352 F.3d 1222, 1230-32 (9th Cir. 2003) (embracing 
Morrison’s warning “to take congressional findings with a grain of salt” and declining to 
infer that the litigants’ marijuana could be sold in the marketplace, which may then result in 
a substantial impact on the interstate drug market), vacated sub nom. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 
S. Ct. 2195 (2005); see also United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303, 1320 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(declining to infer that an individual who produces a depiction of child pornography for 
one’s own consumption will later distribute, sell, or exchange the material), vacated, 125 S. 
Ct. 2938 (2005). 
 157. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208 n.32 (responding to the dissenters’ critique of the 
Court’s use of rational basis scrutiny by declaring that the dissenters would impose an 
“unprecedented” and “impractical” burden on Congress’s ability to effectively regulate 
interstate commerce).  The Court repeated that the “absence of particularized findings” does 
not cast doubt unto Congress’s ability to regulate under the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 2208. 
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marijuana for medical purposes affect the interstate drug market,158 the 
Court resurrected the rational basis standard.159  It inferred that ruling for 
the litigants would lead to an exemption for marijuana that would include 
not only the sick, but their “friends, neighbors, and family members,” and 
thus could have a substantial impact on interstate commerce.160 
C. Resolving the Circuit Split over the Intrastate Production                         
of Child Pornography 
Now that the Supreme Court has provided an expansive set of 
constitutional parameters for resolving as-applied challenges under the 
Commerce Clause,161 the macrocosmic approach exemplified by the First 
Circuit in Morales-De Jesús will prevail over the microcosmic approach 
employed by the Eleventh Circuit in Smith.  Future litigants will not 
succeed if they raise as-applied challenges to the federal pornography 
statute on the basis that their intrastate, noncommercial conduct has only an 
attenuated connection to interstate commerce.162 
In both Morales-De Jesús and Smith, the defendants challenged that 
§ 2251(a) was unconstitutional as applied to them because the defendants 
produced the child pornography for their own use.163  Neither defendant 
had distributed, traded, or sold the child pornography they created, nor was 
there any evidence that they intended to do so.164  Under the expansive 
                                                 
 158. See id. at 2211 (determining that since the CSA regulates the production, 
distribution, and consumption of products for which there is a profitable, national market, 
the prohibition of the intrastate cultivation and possession of such products is a rational way 
to effectively regulate commerce in that commodity). 
 159. See id. at 2208 (echoing that the Court only needs to employ rational basis scrutiny 
in reviewing legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause); cf. United States v. Morales-
De Jesús, 372 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) (explaining that the Government only needs to 
prove that the defendant produced a depiction of child pornography that could find its way 
into the national child pornography market), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2929 (2005). 
 160. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2212. 
 161. See supra Part III.B (explaining how the Court applied the macrocosmic approach 
to the litigants’ as-applied challenge in the debate over the intrastate production and 
consumption of medical marijuana). 
 162. See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 126 S. Ct. 321 (2005) (vacating circuit court’s 
decision sustaining as-applied challenge to § 2251(a) and remanding for reconsideration in 
light of Raich); United States v. Smith, 125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005); United States v. Stewart, 
125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005) (vacating and remanding in light of Raich).  But see Morales-De 
Jesús, 372 F.3d at 15 (noting that a defendant may prevail with an as-applied challenge to 
the federal pornography statute where no sexual exploitation has taken place). 
 163. See Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 17 (noting defendant’s argument that he had no 
intention to purchase, distribute, or sell the homegrown pornography); United States v. 
Smith, 402 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2005) (observing defendant’s contentions that he 
lacked knowledge that the materials used to produce visual depictions of himself having sex 
with minors were transported in interstate commerce, that he never distributed, sold, or 
exchanged the homegrown pornography, and that the state lacked evidence showing that he 
intended to do so), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005). 
 164. Compare Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 19 (dismissing the defendant’s as-applied 
challenge since the “apparent commercial character” does not depend on any intent by the 
BIANCHINI OFFTOPRINTER (2) 2/24/2006  1:43:12 PM 
566 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:543 
definition of commercial activity adopted by the Raich Court, the courts 
may classify the defendants’ activity as commercial if they create a product 
for which there is an interstate market.165  Even if courts employ a more 
traditional definition of commerce activity and classify the defendants’ 
activity as noncommercial, they may still find the statute constitutional as 
applied to the defendants.166  As held in Morales-De Jesús and more 
recently in Raich, if the challenged statute itself regulates commercial 
activity, Congress may reach the defendants’ local, noncommercial 
conduct.167  As a result, Congress may reach Smith and Morales’ intrastate, 
noncommercial activity because § 2251(a) is a provision of the CPPA that 
seeks to regulate the multi-million dollar interstate market in child 
pornography.168 
Under the more expansive approach, courts may use Wickard to 
aggregate a defendant’s noncommercial activity.169  To support this 
interpretation of Wickard, the courts must place little importance upon the 
fact that Congress enacted the CPPA, unlike the statute in Wickard, to 
eliminate a market instead of preserving it through regulation.170  Instead, 
                                                 
defendant to introduce the proscribed visual depictions into commerce), with Smith, 402 
F.3d at 1315-16 (concluding that the defendant’s intrastate, noncommercial production and 
possession of child pornography is not within Congress’s regulatory authority under the 
Commerce Clause). 
 165. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211 (defining commercial activity as “the production, 
distribution, and consumption of commodities” (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1964))). 
 166. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-19 (1942) (finding federal 
jurisdiction could reach the wheat grown and consumed on a single farm because that wheat 
fed the livestock, which was then “sold, bartered, or exchanged” on the interstate market). 
 167. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205 (concluding that the litigants’ arguably 
noncommercial activity does not exempt them from federal regulation since their conduct is 
part of an “economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce”); Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 17 (determining that Congress’s ability to 
proscribe conduct depends upon on the commercial nature of the class of activities defined 
in the statute and not on the economic facts of an individual case). 
 168. See Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 12 (reviewing congressional findings related to 
the CPPA and its predecessors and concluding that Congress intended “to diminish [the] 
national market” for child pornography); see also Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206 (arguing that 
Wickard permits Congress to regulate intrastate, noncommercial activity as long as it 
concludes that the failure to regulate that activity threatens its ability to effectively regulate 
the interstate market in that commodity); Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 17 (recognizing 
that it is often necessary to control local behavior in order to effectively regulate interstate 
commerce). 
 169. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206 (declaring that under Wickard, Congress can regulate 
intrastate, noncommercial activity if it determines that regulating such conduct is necessary 
in order to effectively regulate the interstate market for a product); Morales-De Jesús, 372 
F.3d at 19-20 (interpreting Lopez and Morrison as requiring only that the general subject of 
the statute, not the defendant’s particular activity, be commercial in order to employ the 
Wickard aggregation principle). 
 170. See United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303, 1318 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that 
Congress enacted § 2251(a) not to control surpluses and shortages in the supply of child 
pornography in the interstate market, but rather to end the sexual exploitation of children), 
vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005). 
BIANCHINI OFFTOPRINTER (2) 2/24/2006  1:43:12 PM 
2005] CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 567 
this approach emphasizes that, as Congress regulated local production of 
wheat because it affected the supply and demand of the commodity in the 
national market, Congress may now regulate the intrastate production of 
child pornography in an effort to curb the supply of that material in the 
national market.171 
While Congress provided the Wickard Court with specific findings that 
demonstrated how local wheat producers substantially affected the national 
market for that commodity,172 Congress has not provided evidence as to 
how the regulation of intrastate noncommercial production of child 
pornography is essential to eliminating the interstate market in child 
pornography.173  This difference, however, is not determinative.174  After 
Raich, courts only have a “modest” task.175  The courts do not have to find 
that the litigants’ activity, when taken in the aggregate, actually has a 
substantial impact on interstate commerce, but only that there is a “rational 
basis” for believing so.176  Consequently, despite the congressional findings 
that much of child pornography is homegrown and distributed without 
commercial motivation,177 the courts may conclude that Congress can reach 
                                                 
 171. See Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 16-17 (concluding that since much of the child 
pornography Congress seeks to regulate is homegrown and finds its way into the national 
market “surreptitiously,” Congress can proscribe the local production that feeds the national 
market, as this production substantially affects interstate commerce); cf. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 
2213 (declaring that “[t]he notion that California law has surgically excised a discrete 
activity that is hermetically sealed off from the larger interstate marijuana market is a 
dubious proposition, and, more importantly, one that Congress could have rationally 
rejected”). 
 172. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125-27 (1942) (acknowledging that the 
consumption of homegrown wheat was the “most variable factor” affecting the national 
wheat market and that without regulating this activity, domestic wheat prices would have 
been greatly affected by the world market). 
 173. See Smith, 402 F.3d at 1320-21 (illustrating that congressional findings support the 
proposition that intrastate commercial producers and other persons who distribute child 
pornography non-commercially affect interstate commerce, but noting that these findings 
fail to show how those who produce child pornography for their own consumption affect the 
national market). 
 174. See Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 11-12 (responding that given the congressional 
findings and subsequent amendments to the Protection of Children Against Sexual 
Exploitation Act, there is no doubt that Congress recognized the need to eliminate the 
national market in child pornography by prohibiting its production at the local level); see 
also Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208 (declaring that the “absence of particularized findings” does 
not cast doubt into Congress’s ability to regulate under the Commerce Clause). 
 175. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208. 
 176. Id.; see Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 17 (arguing that the government only needs 
to prove that the defendant produced a visual depiction of child pornography). 
 177. Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 11 (discussing congressional findings that “many of 
the individuals who distribute [child pornography] do so by gift or exchange without any 
commercial motive” and that “[g]enerally the domestic material is of the ‘homemade’ 
variety” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-536, at 10, 17 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
492, 501, 508)); see also Lisa S. Smith, Private Possession of Child Pornography:  
Narrowing At-Home Privacy Rights, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1011, 1015 (1993) 
(describing the child pornography as an “underground . . . pedophilic subculture” and 
“informal cottage industry [operating] for the pleasure, not the profit, of pedophiles”).  See 
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the defendants’ local, noncommercial production because the depiction 
could find its way into the national child pornography market.178  While 
this conclusion requires the courts to make an inference that the defendants 
will either sell, trade, or distribute the homegrown pornography, the courts 
may make such inferences under the macrocosmic approach.179 
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH ADOPTING THE MACROCOSMIC APPROACH TO 
AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES 
There is little doubt that the Court needed to provide guidance for 
resolving as-applied challenges under the Commerce Clause.180  The 
Court’s macrocosmic approach, however, is flawed.  In focusing 
exclusively on the need for a practical conception of the Commerce Clause, 
the Court has set the constitutional parameters too broadly.181  As a result 
of such an expansive approach, Congress may now regulate most of the 
conduct that Lopez and Morrison sought to limit:  local, noncommercial 
activity without a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce.182  By permitting 
federal regulation over such intrastate criminal behavior, the macrocosmic 
approach presents serious problems for an already overburdened federal 
court system.183 
A.  Doctrinal Problems with the Macrocosmic Approach 
To sustain such an expansive approach for resolving as-applied 
challenges while attempting to avoid the explicit rejection of the 
Commerce Clause precedent set by Lopez and Morrison, the Court made 
                                                 
generally Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 
212 (2001) (arguing that child pornography law is both the solution and the problem 
because it may “unwittingly heighten[] pedophilic desire”). 
 178. See supra note 159 and accompanying text; cf. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209 
(emphasizing that homegrown marijuana may hinder Congress’s ability to eliminate 
marijuana in the interstate market). 
 179. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (detailing how the Court, in Raich, 
employed rational basis scrutiny and found that providing an exemption for the intrastate, 
medicinal use of marijuana may have a substantial impact on the interstate marijuana market 
since the exemption may not be limited to just the sick, but could include their “friends, 
neighbors, and family members”). 
 180. See supra Part II (exploring how two federal circuit courts reached different 
outcomes regarding as-applied challenges to the statute prohibiting the production of child 
pornography despite similar facts). 
 181. See discussion infra Part IV.A (asserting that the Court’s macrocosmic approach is 
not in keeping with recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence, particularly Lopez and 
Morrison). 
 182. See discussion infra Part IV.A (contending that Lopez and Morrison stood for a 
narrower interpretation of the Commerce Clause that distinguished interstate commerce 
from intrastate, noncommercial activity). 
 183. See discussion infra Part IV.B (explaining that the unchecked federalization of local 
crimes threatens the quality of federal courts, clogs federal court dockets, and strains federal 
prosecutors and federal police agencies). 
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several dubious claims.  The Raich Court adopted an unprecedented and 
expansive definition of commercial activity184 and misinterpreted Wickard 
as allowing federal regulation of noncommercial activity.185  Additionally, 
the Court resurrected rational basis review to justify federal regulation over 
intrastate conduct with an exceedingly attenuated connection to interstate 
commerce.186 
Lopez and Morrison articulated an approach to addressing Commerce 
Clause challenges that sought to preserve the distinction between “what is 
national and what is local,”187 so to avoid creating an increasingly 
centralized government.188  Yet, the Raich Court adopted an unprecedented 
definition of economic activity, encompassing a greater amount of local 
activity than more traditional definitions.189  By opting for a definition of 
economic activity that includes “producing” and “consuming” a good for 
which there is a national market,190 there is little Congress is unable to 
regulate considering all the products for which an interstate market 
exists.191 
                                                 
 184. See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text (comparing Wickard’s definition 
of commerce as “[selling], barter[ing], or exchang[ing],” 317 U.S. 111, 119, 138 (1942) 
with Raich’s definition of commerce as “production, distribution, and consumption,” 125 S. 
Ct. 2195, 2211 (2005) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 
(1966))). 
 185. See supra notes 205-207 and accompanying text (explaining that the conduct at 
issue in Wickard—harvesting wheat in excess of a regulatory quota—constituted 
commercial activity because part of the wheat crop and livestock which fed on the excess 
wheat were sold in interstate commerce). 
 186. See discussion infra Part IV.A (demonstrating how the Court’s dubious arguments 
are inconsistent with Commerce Clause precedent). 
 187. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 566-67 (1995) (citation ommitted)).  In Gregory v. Ashcroft, Justice 
O’Connor enumerated the virtues of federalism: 
It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse 
needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement 
in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in 
government; and it makes government more responsive by putting the States in 
competition for a mobile citizenry . . . . Perhaps the principle benefit of the 
federalist system is a check on abuses of government power. 
501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). 
 188. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935) (Cardozo, 
J., concurring) (warning that the Court should decline to adopt a view of causation that 
could very well “obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local in the 
activities of commerce”). 
 189. See Jonathan H. Adler, Federalism, Up in Smoke?, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, June 7, 
2005, http://www.nationalreview.com/adler/adler200506070921.asp (observing that few 
other dictionaries beside Webster’s Third New International Dictionary provide such an 
expansive definition). 
 190. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211. 
 191. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000) (“In a sense any conduct in 
this interdependent world of ours has an ultimate commercial origin or consequence, but we 
have not yet said the commerce power may reach so far.” (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 
(Kennedy, J., concurring))); see also Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2224-25 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(rejecting the Court’s definition of economic activity as it could encompass nearly “all 
productive human activity . . . [as] . . . most commercial goods . . . have some sort of 
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The Court’s misinterpretation of Wickard in Raich further illustrates the 
Court’s departure from Lopez and Morrison’s holdings that Congress could 
not regulate local, noncommercial activity.  In both Lopez and Morrison, 
the Court labeled Wickard as the “most far-reaching example of Commerce 
Clause authority over intrastate activity.”192  Recognizing that the Court’s 
pre-Lopez decisions upheld the aggregation of local activity under Wickard 
only where the litigants themselves were engaged in economic activity,193 
Lopez and Morrison declined to extend Congress’s regulatory reach 
further.194  By employing the macrocosmic approach, however, Raich now 
supplants the limits of Wickard. 
Under the far-reaching approach in Raich, Wickard now stands for the 
proposition that only the general subject of the statute needs to be 
commercial for aggregation of the litigants’ local conduct to occur.195  This 
view of the aggregation principle relies on a fundamental misinterpretation 
of Wickard as involving noncommercial activity.196  The First Circuit in 
Morales-De Jesús197 and the Supreme Court in Raich198 relied on one 
sentence in Wickard to support this misinterpretation:  “[T]hough it may 
                                                 
privately producible analogue”). 
 192. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561); see also United States 
v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1141 (9th Cir. 2003) (viewing Wickard as “quite radical” in its 
interpretation of the commerce power, because it first declared “Congress’s power to 
regulate persons and things twice and thrice removed from interstate commerce”), vacated, 
125 S. Ct. 2899 (2005) (remanding case for reconsideration in light of Raich). 
 193. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 
(1981) (permitting federal regulation of intrastate coal mining); Perez v. United States, 402 
U.S. 146 (1971) (finding that Congress’s commerce power extended to regulation of 
intrastate loan sharking); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) 
(upholding the same statute where defendant owned and operated a hotel which catered to 
interstate guests); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding a federal statute 
that proscribed racial discrimination where litigant’s restaurant used substantial interstate 
supplies). 
 194. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 (rejecting the argument that Congress may regulate 
non-economic criminal conduct, such as violence against women, based only upon that 
conduct’s “aggregate effect” on interstate commerce); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (maintaining 
that the conduct at issue in Wickard involved commercial activity in a way that gun 
possession in a school zone does not). 
 195. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206 (arguing that Wickard stands for Congress’s ability to 
regulate intrastate, noncommercial activity if Congress determines that regulating such 
conduct is necessary in order to effectively regulate the interstate market for a product); 
United States v. Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2004) (contending that only the 
general subject of the statute, and not the litigant’s particular activity, need be commercial in 
nature in order to use the Wickard aggregation principle), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2929 
(2005). 
 196. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205-06 (relying upon the language that “even if appellee’s 
activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its 
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate 
commerce” (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942))); Morales-De Jesús, 
372 F.3d at 15 (utilizing the same language to support aggregating intrastate, 
noncommercial activity that substantially affects interstate commerce). 
 197. 372 F.3d at 15. 
 198. 125 S. Ct. at 2205-06. 
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not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached 
by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate 
commerce.”199  Taken in context, however, this sentence came after the 
Wickard Court’s rejection of previous holdings200 that had unreasonably 
constrained Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce—by 
preventing it from regulating mining, production, and manufacturing 
merely because the Court did not consider these activities to be 
“commerce” in its narrowest sense.201 
Often overlooked by some scholars,202 lower courts like the First Circuit 
in Morales-De Jesús,203 and now the Raich majority,204 are the facts that the 
farmer in Wickard operated a commercial farm and that the wheat he grew 
in excess of his allotment supported his farm’s commercial operations.205  
Specifically, he sold part of the wheat crop, and sold the poultry and 
livestock that fed on the wheat.206  Thus, the Court found that Congress 
could reach the litigant because he fed his wheat to “poultry [and] livestock 
which, or the products of which, are sold, bartered, or exchanged.”207  In 
truth, then, Wickard did not employ the macrocosmic approach’s expansive 
definition of commerce,208 and involved commercial activity in a way that 
                                                 
 199. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125. 
 200. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down federal 
regulation of the coal industry, including minimum wages and maximum hours, because 
manufacturing did not constitute “commerce”); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating a portion of the National Internal Recovery Act dealing 
with minimum wages and maximum hours because even though the defendant’s product had 
moved interstate, the defendant engaged in distribution and not “commerce”). 
 201. Wickard followed the landmark case NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 
U.S. 1 (1937), where the Court departed from precedent holding certain activities to be non-
commercial.  See Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 57 (rejecting argument that mining, 
production, and manufacturing did not constitute commerce).  Contra Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 
at 304 (“Mining brings the subject matter of commerce into existence. Commerce disposes 
of it.”); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (“Commerce succeeds to 
manufacture, and is not part of it.”). 
 202. See Saylor, supra note 67, at 65 (criticizing Morrison for creating the determinative 
distinction between economic and non-economic activity while reaffirming Wickard, 
because the Wickard opinion found that the litigant’s activity was not economic in nature). 
 203. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (observing Morales-De Jesús’s 
conclusion that Wickard supports the aggregation of noncommercial, intrastate activity). 
 204. See supra Part II.A (analyzing Raich’s interpretation of Wickard as permitting 
federal regulation over intrastate noncommercial activity as long as Congress concluded that 
regulating such conduct was a necessary part of regulating the interstate market for a 
product). 
 205. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 114 (1942) (finding the litigant’s business 
operations included “maintaining a herd of dairy cattle, selling milk, raising poultry, and 
selling poultry and eggs”).  See generally Jim Chen, Filburn’s Legacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719, 
1734 (2003) (noting that Filburn harvested nearly twice the amount permissible under 
federal law). 
 206. See Chen, supra note 205, at 1734 (providing that, in addition, “Filburn . . . ground 
part [of his surplus harvest] into flour for household consumption, and kept the rest as seed 
for the following season”). 
 207. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 118-19. 
 208. Compare id. at 119 (finding federal jurisdiction could extend to the intrastate 
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the litigants in Raich, Morales-De Jesús, and Smith did not.209 
To argue that the expansive interpretation of Wickard does not alter 
Commerce Clause precedent, both Raich and Morales-De Jesús relied on 
the fact that the statutes in Lopez and Morrison did not regulate activity for 
which there is an interstate market, unlike the child pornography market in 
Morales and the marijuana market in Raich.210  While this is a 
distinguishing factor, the macrocosmic approach still violates Commerce 
Clause precedent.  Under this framework, Wickard stands for the 
unprecedented proposition that Congress can regulate local, non-economic 
conduct because it may parallel some economic activity or product in the 
interstate market without any showing that regulating the litigants’ conduct 
is essential to the statutory scheme.211 
Given such considerable leeway, Congress can simply draft statutes 
broadly enough to encompass some commercial activity in order to ensnare 
the activity that Lopez and Morrison explicitly placed out of Congress’s 
reach—local, noncommercial conduct without a sufficient nexus to 
interstate commerce.212  For example, under this approach, the statute 
struck down in Lopez could have survived constitutional scrutiny if 
Congress had placed it within a comprehensive scheme regulating 
firearms.213  Wickard, however, does not stand for the legitimacy of federal 
                                                 
cultivation and consumption of wheat because the wheat was used to feed poultry and 
livestock, which were “sold, bartered or exchanged”), with Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 
2195, 2211 (2005) (defining commercial activity as including “production, distribution, and 
consumption of commodities” (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 720 (1966))). 
 209. Compare Wickard, 317 U.S. at 119 (observing that the litigant sold the poultry and 
livestock which fed on the surplus wheat), with Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207 (finding the CSA 
constitutional as applied to litigants who merely cultivated, possessed, and consumed 
marijuana for medical purposes). 
 210. See discussion supra Part III.B (explaining how the First Circuit in Morales-De 
Jesús and the Court in Raich placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the statutes 
regulated activity for which there is an interstate market). 
 211. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2223 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s logic 
in that it assumes any local activity is essential to a regulatory scheme as long as Congress 
placed that local activity within a broad regulatory scheme); see also United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (declining to uphold statute since it was not an “essential part of a 
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme would be undercut 
unless the intrastate activity were regulated”). 
 212. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (barring Congress from 
regulating non-economic activity on the basis of its aggregate affect on interstate 
commerce); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 600 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that “one always can 
draw the circle broadly enough to cover an activity that, when taken in isolation, would not 
have substantial effects on commerce”) (emphasis in original); see also discussion supra 
Part I (explaining how the local, criminal and noncommercial nature of the activity 
regulated by the statutes in Lopez and Morrison was central to the Court’s decision). 
 213. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2222 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s 
contradictory approach in being willing to evaluate the statute in Lopez in isolation, but not 
viewing the local activity encompassed by the CSA in isolation because it is merely a part of 
a broad regulatory scheme); see also id. at 2223 (denouncing the majority’s approach as 
reducing Lopez to a “drafting guide”). 
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regulation over any commodity for which there is a national market.214  On 
the contrary, the statute in Wickard exempted small farms from the 
regulation.215  In addition, in Wickard, Congress made specific findings on 
how farmers just like the litigant, when taken in the aggregate, could vary 
the amount of wheat sent to market by as much as twenty percent.216  With 
such findings, the Court had no doubt that the home consumption of wheat, 
if left unregulated, “would have a substantial effect in defeating and 
obstructing [Congress’s] desire to stimulate trade at increased prices.”217 
Unlike the case in Wickard, there are no congressional findings that 
show how individuals who produce child pornography or cultivate 
marijuana for their own consumption substantially affect those national 
markets.218  Instead, the courts in Morales-De Jesús and Raich had to make 
inferences to overcome the lack of congressional findings.219  This, 
however, is at odds with Lopez and Morrison, where the Court explicitly 
rejected an approach that would require it to “pil[e] inference upon 
inference” in order to permit Congress’s regulatory authority to extend to 
activity that has only a tenuous connection to interstate commerce.220 
The Raich Court simply applied Wickard’s rational basis review and 
found that, unlike the statutes in Lopez and Morrison, the CSA regulated 
                                                 
 214. See id. at 2222 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (denouncing the majority’s interpretation 
of Wickard since the decision did not “extend Commerce Clause authority to something as 
modest as the home cook’s herb garden”). 
 215. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 131 n.30 (1942) (observing that the quota 
was not applicable to any farm on which the acreage allotted for wheat did not exceed 
fifteen acres (internal citation omitted)). 
 216. See id. at 127 (highlighting that the consumption of homegrown wheat constituted 
the “most variable factor” in the larger wheat market). 
 217. Id. at 128-29. 
 218. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208 (admitting an “absence of particularized findings” in 
the CSA as to the effects of intrastate cultivation and personal use of marijuana on interstate 
commerce); United States v. Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 2004) (describing 
Congress’s findings as relating to “the extensive national market in child pornography and 
the need to diminish that national market by prohibiting [its] production . . . at the local 
level” (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2929 (2005).  But see Morales-De Jesús, 
372 F.3d at 11 (noting congressional finding that child pornography “inflames the desires of 
child molesters . . . thereby increasing the creation and distribution” of such materials 
(quoting Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 1(4), 110 Stat. 
3009-26 (1996))). 
 219. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211-12 (reasoning that the CSA regulates the national 
market for marijuana, that personal use of self-produced marijuana impacts that market, and 
therefore, meaningful enforcement of the CSA requires regulation of such intrastate 
activity); Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 16 (finding that child pornography, whether created 
for sale or personal use, constitutes a commodity for Commerce Clause purposes, and that 
prohibiting intrastate production reduces the overall supply of child pornography on the 
national market). 
 220. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (condemning such an 
approach as converting Congress’s Commerce Clause authority into a “general police 
power”); see also Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968) (emphasizing that 
Wickard does not permit Congress to use a “trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for 
broad general regulation of state or private activities”). 
BIANCHINI OFFTOPRINTER (2) 2/24/2006  1:43:12 PM 
574 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:543 
activities that were inherently economic.221  By stating that the Court has 
never required Congress to “legislate with scientific exactitude,”222 the 
Raich Court determined that it did not have to decide whether the litigants’ 
activities, when taken in the aggregate, substantially affected interstate 
commerce in fact, but only whether a “rational basis exists for believing” 
so.223 
This type of judicial deference is difficult, if not impossible, to square 
with Lopez and Morrison.224  Those decisions emphasized that 
congressional findings can be significant in providing the Court with the 
ability to evaluate Congress’s assertion that the activity substantially affects 
interstate commerce, especially where “no such substantial effect [is] 
visible to the naked eye.”225  Further, Lopez and Morrison recognized that it 
is the judiciary, not the legislature, who ultimately decides whether a 
particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce.226  
Consequently,  it is up to the judiciary to accept Congress’s findings that 
purport to show the necessary connection to interstate commerce.227  As 
Rehnquist emphasized in Lopez and later reaffirmed in Morrison, “simply 
because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially 
affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.”228 
Recognizing that Lopez and Morrison preclude Congress’s regulatory 
power from extending to activities with only a tenuous connection to 
interstate commerce, the Raich and Morales-De Jesús majorities defended 
their approach by misinterpreting Commerce Clause precedent yet again.  
Both Morales-De Jesús and Raich relied upon the same language:  Where 
“a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the 
de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of 
no consequence.”229  This quotation is from a footnote in Maryland v. 
                                                 
 221. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2206-11 (2005) (distinguishing Lopez and 
Morrison and instead citing Wickard for the proposition that the Court need only conclude 
that Congress had a rational basis for believing that “home-consumed” commodities, taken 
in aggregate, substantially affect the interstate market for that commodity). 
 222. Id. at 2206. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Compare id. at 2208-09 (arguing that only rational basis scrutiny is necessary when 
evaluating congressional findings that purport to show a connection between activity that 
Congress seeks to regulate and interstate commerce), with Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 
(establishing that whether particular activities affect interstate commerce to the extent 
necessary in order to permit federal regulation is not a legislative question, but a judicial one 
(citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964))). 
 225. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563. 
 226. Id. at 557 n.2 (citation omitted). 
 227. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (stating that congressional 
findings, without more, are insufficient to establish the constitutionality of a statute). 
 228. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 (citation omitted)). 
 229. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 
(1968)); United States v. Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d 6, 17 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 
S. Ct. 2929 (2005). 
BIANCHINI OFFTOPRINTER (2) 2/24/2006  1:43:12 PM 
2005] CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 575 
Wirtz,230 which did not discuss as-applied challenges but the “enterprise 
concept.”231  The enterprise concept grants Congress the ability to exercise 
authority over an industry or large enterprise by regulating its smaller 
parts.232  Thus, this concept extends Congress’s commerce power only to 
enterprises that engage in commerce and does not encompass the 
individualized, noncommercial activity at issue in Raich or Morales-De 
Jesús.233  These courts, however, have interpreted this concept to mean that 
Congress may regulate any “privately producible analogue” to 
“commercial goods or services.”234  In sum, the macrocosmic approach 
employed by Raich and Morales-De Jesús pays only lip service to 
Commerce Clause precedent, while permitting federal regulation over more 
local criminal activity than ever before.  By permitting federal regulation of 
conduct previously reserved for the States to control, this approach not only 
violates Commerce Clause precedent, but poses practical problems as well. 
B. Practical Problems with the Increasing Federalization of Crime 
In recognizing that the federalization of crime threatens the very 
foundation of our dual system of government, Lopez and Morrison both 
emphasized the importance of preserving States’ autonomy over the area of 
criminal law.235  While the States may agree with Congress that certain 
                                                 
 230. In Wirtz, the state of Maryland challenged the Fair Labor Standard Act, which had 
been extended to cover additional categories of employees and removed an exemption for 
state-run enterprises like schools and hospitals.  392 U.S. at 186-87.  The original statute 
required employers to pay their employees the specified minimum wages if they were 
engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce.  Id. at 185-86.  The 
amendment, challenged in Wirtz, expanded the law to encompass all employees working for 
an enterprise engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce, regardless of 
whether the individual employee was actually involved in that activity.  Id. at 186. 
 231. See id. at 197 n.27 (“‘Enterprise’ means the related activities performed (either 
through unified operation or common control) by any person or persons for a common 
business purpose . . . but shall not include the related activities performed for such enterprise 
by an independent contractor.” (quoting Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-
718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)))). 
 232. See id. (upholding the enterprise concept on the “explicit premise that an 
‘enterprise’ is a set of operations whose activities in commerce would all be expected to be 
affected by the wages and hours of any group of employees, which is what Congress 
obviously intended”). 
 233. See id. (emphasizing that the enterprise concept, as explicitly defined above, 
recognizes the limitations of Congress’s regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause); 
see also Kreit, supra note 85, at 197 (arguing that the enterprise concept does not provide 
Congress with “limitless substantive authority,” but permits Congress’s regulatory reach to 
extend only to enterprises engaged in commerce). 
 234. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2225 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).    
 235. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (declining to accept 
petitioner’s but-for causal reasoning because of the concern that, if accepted, it would 
“completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between national and local authority”); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (rejecting the Government’s “costs of 
crime” and “national productivity” theories because, if accepted, it would be difficult to 
posit any meaningful limit on federal power, even in the area of criminal law which has 
historically been left to the States); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2221 
BIANCHINI OFFTOPRINTER (2) 2/24/2006  1:43:12 PM 
576 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:543 
behavior, such as child pornography, should be proscribed, this does not 
legitimize the macrocosmic approach.236  On the contrary, Rehnquist 
maintained in Lopez that when Congress criminalizes conduct that is 
already proscribed by the States, it impacts the “sensitive relation” between 
state and federal jurisdictions.237  Our system of dual sovereignty allows 
States to act as “laboratories”238 to devise innovative solutions to problems 
of traditional state concern like criminal law.239  Therefore, even when both 
federal and state law proscribe a particular activity, disagreement about 
how to achieve that end can exist.240 
Also, by encompassing intrastate criminal activity, the macrocosmic 
approach presents serious problems to an already overworked federal court 
system.241  A 1998 American Bar Association task force “concluded that 
‘inappropriate federalization’ causes ‘long-range damage to real crime 
control and to the nation’s structure.’”242  In a 1998 report on the federal 
                                                 
(2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the States’ police powers have “always 
included authority to define criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of 
their citizens”). 
 236. Cf. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3 (“Most egregiously, section [922(q)] inappropriately 
overrides legitimate State firearms laws with a new and unnecessary Federal law.  The 
policies reflected in these provisions could legitimately be adopted by the States, but they 
should not be imposed upon the States by the Congress.” (quoting President George H.W. 
Bush, Statement on Signing the Crime Control Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
1944, 1945 (1990))).  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 596-97 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining 
that the Court has always rejected readings of the Commerce Clause that would grant 
Congress the power to punish felonies “generally”). 
 237. Id. at 561 n.3. 
 238. Id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 239. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (observing that “a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country”); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2220 (2005) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that one of the primary virtues of federalism is that it encourages 
innovation). 
 240. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“While it is doubtful that any 
State, or indeed any reasonable person, would argue that it is wise policy to allow students 
to carry guns on school premises, considerable disagreement exists about how best to 
accomplish that goal.”). 
 241. See Otto G. Obermaier & Barry A. Bohrer, The ‘Federalization’ of Criminal Law:  
The Last 100 Years Gave Rise to Huge Growth in the Numbers of U.S. Statutes, N.Y.L.J., 
Nov. 29, 1999, at S4 (observing that the trend to federalize criminal conduct historically 
governed by the States began around the turn of the century); see also id. (finding that more 
than forty percent of the federal criminal laws enacted since the Civil War have been 
enacted since 1970). 
 242. Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines:  A Case 
Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 895-96 (2000); see James 
Strazzella et al., Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal Law, AM. BAR ASS’N 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 15, 26-31 (1998), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/fedcrimlaw2.pdf (delineating several adverse 
repercussions to the continuing federalization of criminal law, including, “undermining the 
constitutionally-established role of the states as the primary enforcers of criminal law, 
expanding ‘federal investigative power,’ and establishing a dual criminal justice system 
where the same conduct is subject to differing criminal penalties at the state and federal 
levels”). 
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judiciary, Rehnquist warned that a crisis would result if nothing limited the 
growth of federal crimes.243 
The overburdening of the federal system threatens the very quality of the 
federal courts.244  For example, the increase in criminal cases245 has 
clogged federal court dockets.246  The federal prison population more than 
doubled between 1980 and 1990; and between 1990 and 1995, it nearly 
doubled again.247  Federal prosecutors and federal police agencies also feel 
the strain of this trend.248  And unfortunately, this trend has created an 
interesting paradox:  federalization “creat[es] the illusion of greater crime 
control, while undermining an already over-burdened criminal justice 
system.”249 
V. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE MACROCOSMIC APPROACH 
Since the macrocosmic approach is flawed for its inconsistency with the 
rest of Commerce Clause precedent and its possible deleterious impact on 
the federal court system, the following section proposes an alternate 
                                                 
 243. See Hon. William H. Rehnquist, The 1998 Year-End Report of the Federal 
Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1999, at 1, 2 [hereinafter Rehnquist, 1998 Report] (warning 
that the trend of federalizing crime is “taxing the Judiciary’s resources and affecting budget 
needs, but . . . also threatens to change entirely the nature of our federal system”); see also 
Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice’s 1993 Year-end Report Highlights Cost-saving 
Measures, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1994, at 1, 2 (urging that “we can no longer afford the 
luxury of state and federal courts that work at cross purposes or irrationally duplicate one 
another”). 
 244. See Rehnquist, 1998 Report, supra note 243, at 2 (believing that increasing 
federalization of crime “threatens to change entirely the nature of our federal system”); see 
also Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief:  The Federalization of American Criminal 
Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1165 (1995) (attributing the “impending crisis in the federal 
justice system” to federalization). 
 245. See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime:  Assessing the Impact on the Federal 
Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 45-46 (1996) (noting that the number 
of federal criminal cases grew by seventy percent from 1980 to 1992). 
 246. See Beale, supra note 245, at 46 (“Although criminal cases currently account for 
only seventeen percent of the federal judicial docket, thirty-eight of the ninety-two federal 
districts devoted more than fifty percent of their trial dockets to criminal cases in 1992.”).  
But see Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Federal Power and Federalism:  A Theory of 
Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of Traditionally State Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 921, 963 (1997) (arguing that the recent federalization of crime does not “supplant 
state criminal legislation and bring vast numbers of local crimes into federal court,” but that 
it makes federal prosecution possible where the need for federal response is “difficult to 
deny”); id. (arguing that federal prosecutions occur in only a small fraction of the cases 
covered by federal criminal legislation). 
 247. Anna Johnson Cramer, Note, The Right Result for all the Wrong Reasons:  An 
Historical and Functional Analysis of the Commerce Clause, 53 VAND. L. REV. 271, 287 
(2001) (citing Brickey, supra note 244, at 1157-58 & nn.135-36 (internal citation omitted)). 
 248. See Beale, supra note 245, at 44-48 (finding that the federalization of crime has 
shifted resources from civil to criminal cases despite an overall growth in the number of 
federal prosecutors and financial resources since the 1970s). 
 249. See James A. Strazzella & William W. Taylor, Federalizing Crime:  Examining The 
Congressional Trend To Duplicate State Laws, 14 CRIM. JUST. 4, 6 (1999) (explaining that 
the impetus for the federalization trend is that it is politically popular). 
BIANCHINI OFFTOPRINTER (2) 2/24/2006  1:43:12 PM 
578 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:543 
approach to resolving as-applied challenges to the Commerce Clause.  This 
proposal seeks to balance the need for a practical conception of the 
commerce power with the need to limit Congress’s regulatory authority to 
preserve the sovereignty of the States.250  This section first sets forth the 
proposed alternative, and then explains how the courts should apply it to 
the intrastate production of child pornography. 
A. The Alternate Approach to Resolving As-Applied Challenges under the 
Commerce Clause Generally 
Under the alternate approach, the courts would employ rational basis 
scrutiny when the litigant’s intrastate activity is economic in nature,251 but 
would implement a heightened level of scrutiny when the litigant’s 
intrastate activity is noncommercial.252  Courts would consider the nature of 
the litigant’s conduct, and not merely look at the general subject of the 
statute, because Congress could almost always define the regulated activity 
with such generality that it would include some commercial applications.253  
Thus, this approach is designed to prevent federal regulation over 
intrastate, noncommercial activity that lacks any real connection to 
interstate commerce.  Moreover, this approach is in keeping with the 
precedent set by Lopez and Morrison, where the Court employed a 
heightened level of scrutiny in evaluating whether noncommercial 
activities like gun possession in schools and gender-motivated violence 
substantially affected interstate commerce.254 
                                                 
 250. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“The federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays too vital 
a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level 
of Government has tipped the scale too far.”). 
 251. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1970) (using rational basis 
scrutiny to determine that federal law prohibiting extortionate credit transactions could be 
applied to an individual engaged in loan sharking within one state); Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964) (applying rational basis scrutiny to 
determine that federal law prohibiting racial discrimination could reach litigant who owned 
and operated a motel with seventy-five percent of its customers out-of-state residents); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1964) (applying rational basis scrutiny to 
determine that federal law proscribing racial discrimination could reach litigant who owned 
and operated a local restaurant that received over $70,000 worth of food from out-of-state). 
 252. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (emphasizing that the 
Court has only upheld the regulation of intrastate activity where the activity has been 
economic in nature). 
 253. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565 (rejecting Justice Breyer’s rationale as “lack[ing] any 
real limits because, depending on the level of generality, any activity can be looked upon as 
commercial”). 
 254. See United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1459 (6th Cir. 1995) (observing that the 
Lopez Court applied a higher standard of review than the rational basis level of scrutiny for 
evaluating the constitutionality of regulating noncommercial activity under the Commerce 
Clause); see also Dral & Phillips, supra note 18, at 616-17 (explaining that in both Lopez 
and Morrison, the Court struck down legislation by employing a level of scrutiny that was 
stricter than rational basis). 
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In determining whether the litigant’s activity is commercial, courts 
would not use Raich’s expansive definition of “economic.”255  Given the 
vast array of commodities available in the interstate market, there is little 
activity that the courts would not classify as “economic” under Raich’s 
definition.256  Instead, courts would employ the prevailing definition of 
commerce in Commerce Clause jurisprudence—one that encompasses the 
activities of selling, bartering, or exchanging.257 
In seeking to balance a practical understanding of the commerce power 
with the need for a meaningful limit on Congress’s regulatory authority, 
this alternative ensures that the noncommercial nature of a litigant’s 
conduct will not necessarily exempt him from federal regulation.258  Where 
the litigant’s conduct is noncommercial, the courts would use a heightened 
level of scrutiny as the Supreme Court did in Lopez and Morrison.259  
Under this heightened scrutiny, the courts could conclude from the 
congressional findings whether the litigant’s activity, when aggregated with 
others similarly situated, would substantially affect interstate commerce.260  
The courts should not, however, follow Raich and Morales-De Jesús’ 
approach of substituting their inferences to overcome a lack of these 
congressional findings.261 
                                                 
 255. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2236 n.7 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing majority’s use of a “remarkably expansive forty-year-old definition” of 
“economic” where “[o]ther dictionaries do not define [the term] as broadly”).  As an 
example, Justice Thomas cited the American Heritage Dictionary, which defines 
“economic” as “[o]f or relating to the production, development, and management of material 
wealth, as of a country, household, or business enterprise.”  Id. (quoting THE AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 583 (3d ed. 1992)). 
 256. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 (“In a sense any conduct in this interdependent world 
of ours has an ultimate commercial origin or consequence, but we have not yet said the 
commerce power may reach so far.”). 
 257. Black’s Law Dictionary defines commerce as “[t]he exchange of goods and 
services, esp. on a large scale involving transportation between cities, states, and nations.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 285 (8th ed. 2004). 
 258. This proposal seeks to avoid the problems associated with allowing Congress’s to 
legislate under the clause without check.  See discussion supra Part IV.B (illustrating the 
practical problems with the increasing federalization of local crime).  This proposal also 
seeks to avoid digressing to the pre-1937 era of the Commerce Clause precedent.  See supra 
note 27  (demonstrating how the Court employed arbitrary distinctions that unduly 
interfered with Congress’s ability to regulate interstate commerce effectively). 
 259. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (employing a heightened 
level of scrutiny in determining whether the federal jurisdiction could extend to gun 
possession in a school zone); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (employing heightened level of 
scrutiny in determining whether federal jurisdiction could extend to those who commit 
gender-motivated acts of violence). 
 260. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (“The reasoning that petitioners advance seeks to 
follow the but-for casual chain from the initial occurrence of violent crime (the suppression 
of which has always been the prime object of the States’ police power) to every attenuated 
effect upon interstate commerce.”).  “If accepted, petitioners’ reasoning would allow 
Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime 
has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption.”  Id. 
 261. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2219 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
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This approach is consistent with the Wickard decision, that once was and 
should still be the most expansive use of the Commerce Clause.262  Even if 
one disagreed with the argument that the litigant in Wickard had engaged in 
commercial activity, Congress would still be able to reach his conduct 
under the approach proposed here because of the explicit congressional 
findings demonstrating how farms producing wheat for their own 
consumption substantially affected the interstate wheat market.263  Thus, 
the courts would not be able to make inferences as to how the specific type 
of activity engaged in by the litigant, when taken in the aggregate, 
substantially affects interstate commerce.264 
B. The Alternate Approach Applied to the Intrastate                               
Production of Child Pornography 
Under this framework, a litigant who produced a depiction of child 
pornography for his own use, but never traded, distributed, or sold the 
material, would prevail with his as-applied challenge to the statute.  This is 
because the litigant engaged in local and noncommercial criminal activity 
with an attenuated connection to interstate commerce.265  In other words, 
the litigant engaged in the very activity that Lopez and Morrison declined 
to permit federal regulation to reach. 
Under the traditional definition of commercial activity, a litigant’s 
intrastate conduct is properly classified as noncommercial if he does not 
sell, trade, or exchange the child pornography.266  Consequently, courts 
should employ a heightened level of scrutiny in evaluating the 
congressional findings purporting to show a sufficient nexus between the 
                                                 
(finding that Congress could reach the local cultivation and consumption of medicinal 
marijuana because the product is “never more than an instant” from the interstate market, 
and that an exemption would likely lead to the use of not only the sick, but their “friends, 
neighbors, and family members,” and thus may have a substantial impact on the interstate 
market); United States v. Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d 6, 17 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
the Government was only required to prove that the defendant produced a depiction of child 
pornography that could find its way into the interstate market, and not that he sold, 
distributed, or exchanged the material), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2929 (2005). 
 262. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 
(describing Wickard as “perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause 
authority over intrastate activity”). 
 263. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127 (finding that the home consumption of wheat affected 
the national wheat market by as much as twenty percent and was the “most variable factor in 
the disappearance of the wheat crop”). 
 264. See id. at 127-28 (finding federal jurisdiction could extend to a local farmer since 
the findings provided the Court with the ability to conclude that his contribution to the 
national wheat market, when taken together with others similarly situated, was “far from 
trivial”). 
 265. See Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 11-12 (finding that many who distribute child 
pornography in the United States do so without any commercial purpose). 
 266. See supra note 257 and accompanying text (adopting a definition of commerce that 
encompasses the exchanging, buying, and selling of commodities). 
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litigant’s activity and the interstate child pornography market.267 
The relevant congressional findings show that much of the child 
pornography is homegrown and distributed without commercial 
motivation.268  Given these findings, the courts would have to make an 
inference to find that the litigant’s conduct, when taken in the aggregate, 
substantially affected the interstate child pornography market.269  
Specifically, the courts must infer that the litigant will either sell, trade, or 
distribute the depiction.  Because the courts cannot make such inferences 
under this level of scrutiny, the litigant will prevail with his as-applied 
challenge. 
CONCLUSION 
Lopez and Morrison resurrected the Commerce Clause principle that 
there must be a reasonable limit to Congress’s regulatory power.  By 
upholding the litigants’ facial challenges to those statutes, however, those 
decisions provided insufficient guidance for resolving as-applied 
challenges under the Commerce Clause.  Courts adopted two different 
approaches for resolving these challenges:  the macrocosmic approach and 
the microcosmic approach.  In supporting a particular approach, courts 
focused on one of two competing interests within the larger framework of 
the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  The macrocosmic approach, 
employed by Morales-De Jesús and the Supreme Court in Raich, focused 
on the principle that the court must employ a practical conception of the 
commerce power.  The microcosmic approach, on the other hand, 
employed by Smith and the Ninth Circuit in Raich, focused on the 
competing Commerce Clause value that there must be a meaningful limit 
on Congress’s regulatory authority. 
While the Supreme Court’s Raich decision provided much needed 
clarification to the lower courts for resolving as-applied challenges, its 
adoption of the macrocosmic approach is flawed.  The Court’s 
preoccupation with a practical conception of the Commerce Clause caused 
the Court to set the constitutional parameters so broadly that there is little 
activity that cannot be subject to federal regulation. 
                                                 
 267. See supra notes 252-254 and accompanying text (explaining that employing a 
heightened level of scrutiny in evaluating whether federal jurisdiction can extend to 
intrastate, noncommercial activity is in keeping with Commerce Clause precedent). 
 268. H.R. REP. NO. 98-536, at 10, 17 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.S.C.A.N. 492, 501. 
 269. See United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303, 1320 (11th Cir. 2005) (determining, 
without explanation, that the congressional findings demonstrate how intrastate commercial 
producers and persons who distribute child pornography non-commercially affect interstate 
commerce), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2938 (2005); Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d at 17 (permitting 
federal jurisdiction to reach the defendant on the assumption that the child pornography he 
produced could find its way into the interstate market). 
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